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The purpose of this study is to provide a clear understanding of the nexus of crime 
and terrorism, using the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) as a case study. This terrorist group in 
the southern part of the Philippines has evolved as a hybrid organization, combining 
terrorist and criminal activities to achieve its objectives. Moreover, as a terrorist 
organization, ASG effectively employs criminal tactics for its survival. This group draws 
its strength and resilience from collusion with various lawless elements and other 
criminal groups in Mindanao.  
This paper examines the theoretical framework of Makarenko’s Crime-Terror 
(CT) Continuum to provide compelling explanations of the interaction and 
interoperability of crime and terrorism in the case of the ASG. It also highlights the 
Philippine CT strategy and approach to counter terrorism and discusses some notable 
gaps and problems, particularly its failure to recognize the ASG as a hybrid organization. 
This thesis concludes that the current Philippine counterterrorism strategy, although 
effective and in good shape, seems inadequate against hybrid organizations. Thus, this 
paper proposes that the Philippines re-examine its current CT strategy to be more 
appropriate, effective, and responsive against hybrid terrorist organizations. 
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 1 
I. INTRODUCTION  
In the past two decades, abductions in Mindanao, the second-largest and 
southernmost island in the Philippines, have created an impression of the region as the 
kidnapping capital of the Philippines. Terrorist organizations and other lawless elements 
partner in criminal activities in this region. Although kidnapping for ransom seems to be 
the most favored activity, drug trafficking, arms smuggling, extortion, and assassinations 
round out the regular activities of these organizations. These problems persist due to the 
weak rule of law, the lack of good governance, illiteracy, unemployment, widespread 
poverty, and the sense of injustice among Muslims in Mindanao, all of which exacerbate 
the state of lawlessness, particularly in some Muslim areas in Mindanao. 
Significantly, the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) has been the dominant group in terms 
of kidnapping in Mindanao. It has perpetrated a number of high-profile and sensational 
kidnapping incidents, especially following the death of its founding leader, Abdul Razak 
Abubakar Janjalani, in December 1998. Janjalani’s death resulted in the temporary 
cessation of support from foreign terrorist organizations. Because of the collective efforts 
of various nations to combat terrorism and dismantle their global networks, support from 
foreign terrorist organizations has been reduced. These factors further drove the ASG to 
turn to criminal activities, particularly kidnapping for ransom, as a source of income 
either in support of the organization or for personal gain.  
A. MAJOR RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis will focus on the criminal and terroristic activities of the ASG. The 
ASG provides a good example of how crime and terrorism intersect. The criminal 
activities of the ASG have been lucrative.1 The funds obtained from these activities have 
become the backbone of the group’s operational capability. Thus, this thesis asks, has the 
ASG's embrace of organized crime methods made it a more lethal terrorist group? Also, 
                                                 
1 McKenzie O’Brien, “Fluctuations Between Crime and Terror: The Case of Abu Sayyaf’s Kidnapping 
Activities,” Terrorism and Political Violence 24, no. 2 (2012): 326, DOI:10.1080/09546553.2011.648679. 
 2 
how can the Philippine counterterrorism (CT) strategy benefit from understanding ASG 
as an organized crime organization? 
B. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH QUESTION 
Despite the neutralization of key leaders, the ASG remains a major threat to the 
peace and order of the country. The Philippine government’s responses seem to be 
ineffective in dismantling a small terrorist organization and thwarting its criminal 
activities. This fluctuation from terrorism to criminal behavior creates confusion about 
the appropriate approach and strategy to combat these threat groups. 
According to Chris Dishman, it is important to be aware of the transformation of 
terrorist groups’ motivations and political objectives because a profound involvement in 
criminal activity tends to change the aims and motivations of leaders.2 He claims that if a 
terrorist organization realizes that its cause has become pointless or unpopular, it may 
resort to criminal activities employing its terrorist skills and assets and continue to use its 
political justification.3 Hybrid organizations pose more challenges and require a different 
strategy and approach, however. Rommel Banlaoi claims that it is not an easy job to 
confront a terrorist group that is politically and ideologically motivated, collaborating 
with lawless elements, and getting involved in criminal activities.4 He writes that the 
ASG pulls “tremendous strength from its superb ability” to collude with various armed 
groups in Mindanao.5 When the ASG embarks on a series of criminal activities, 
especially kidnappings, huge financial gains corrupt its leaders, and they tend to focus on 
the financial gains of these operations. 
Some counterterrorism experts in the Philippines believe that the problem with 
the ASG should be handled by the police, and they must enforce the law. The ASG, 
                                                 
2 Chris Dishman, “Terrorism, Crime, and Transformation,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 24, no. 1 
(August 2010): 56, DOI: 10.1080/10576100118878. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Rommel Banlaoi, “Current Terrorist Groups and Emerging Extremist Armed Movements in the 
Southern Philippines: Threats to Philippine National Security,” National Defense College of the 
Philippines, accessed May 16, 2016, http://www.ndcp.edu.ph/nsr.php.  
5 Ibid. 
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however, operates in mountainous and far-flung areas of Basilan and Sulu, where the 
police could be ineffective. The local police are not adequately equipped and trained in 
jungle warfare or in counterterrorism operations. In most cases, the ASG is better 
equipped than the local police in terms of firearms and equipment. The Philippine 
government may benefit from thinking of terrorism and crime as two different things; 
thus, it may require two distinct approaches to combat the threat. Zack Fellman claims 
that there are instances when the ASG still engages in acts of violence such as bombings 
and assassinations, which make them more difficult to comprehend and confront.6 
Mckenzie O’Brien argues that despite its small numbers, the ASG will continue to 
pose a threat to the Philippines because of the ASG’s ability to recruit young and 
aggressive fighters through financial rewards.7 Potential members are enticed to join 
because of monetary reasons and not by their Islamic beliefs.8 Criminal activities have 
become a common tactic among the terrorists because crime is a lucrative way of 
generating funds for the group’s operational capability.9 Most terrorist groups realize that 
embracing organized crime methods would make them more effective, stronger, and 
more lethal.10 Despite their rampant criminal activities—or more accurately, because of 
their embrace of crime—some terrorist organizations remain an active threat, capable of 
executing bombings and other violence.11 
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
To address the major research questions, this literature review will critically 
analyze, evaluate, and compare prior research studies and other scholarly sources related 
to the thesis’s main theme. First, this review will provide a critical analysis of the 
definition of terrorism and who terrorists are. Second, it presents a theoretical framework 
                                                 
6 Zack Fellman, “Abu Sayyaf Group,” Center for Strategic Studies and International Studies, case 
study no. 5 (November 2011): 5−6. 






that explains the nexus of crime and terrorism. Third, it provides basic knowledge about 
the ASG as the main focus of this paper. Finally, this review will present a preliminary 
discussion of a comprehensive and holistic approach to counter-terrorism by examining 
the responses of other countries. 
1. Definition of Terrorism 
Although experts and scholars have different definitions of terrorism, all of them 
broadly agree that it is a “kind of activity involving the threat or application of 
violence.”12 Leonard Weinberg states that “terrorism is the calculated use of violence or 
threat to coerce or intimidate governments or societies in pursuit of political, ideological, 
and religious ends.”13 He defines terrorism as a “politically motivated tactic,”14 which 
involves the use of threats or violence to achieve widespread publicity. Harmonie Toros 
and Luca Mavelli agree that, among more than 100 definitions of terrorism, one common 
characteristic that emerges is the political nature of the acts.15 
This special political charge of the violence is reflected in the legal frameworks 
that address terrorism and countering terrorism. Weinberg claims that most countries, 
especially democracies, have made terrorism a crime in their domestic law. He claims 
that such countries as the United States and the United Kingdom have made an effort to 
broaden the definition of terrorism “to criminalize a wider range of behaviors.”16 This 
effort led to the legislation of a more expansive terrorism law and having a clear legal 
definition of terrorism both in the United States and the United Kingdom. According to 
James Beckman, the Patriot Act supersedes “hundreds of provisions and amended many 
federal statutes” regarding anti-terrorism.17 He claims that the main goal of the law is to 
                                                 
12 Weinberg, Democracy and Terrorism, 11. See also, Alexander Aguirre, “The Philippine Response 
to Terrorism,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence, and Counter-Terrorism 4, no. 1 (August 2011): 10, 
DOI:10.1080/18335300.2009.9686923. 
13 Ibid., 47. 
14 Ibid., 10. 
15 Harmonie Toros and Luca Mavelli, “Terrorism, Organized Crime and the Biopolitics of Violence,” 
Critical Studies on Terrorism 6, no. 1 (April 5, 2013): 73−74, DOI:10.1080/17539153.2013.765701.    
16 Ibid., 11. 
17 James Beckman, Comparative Legal Approaches to Homeland Security and Anti-Terrorism 
(Aldershot, England; Burlington, VT: Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 27. 
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enhance the ability of federal law enforcement to counter terrorism. Beckman writes that 
the Patriot Act widens the definition of terrorism by including domestic terrorism as 
“prior to 2001, the U.S. law only defines acts of international terrorism.”18  
The Philippine anti-terrorism law, the Republic Act 9372, otherwise known as the 
Human Security Act of 2007, defines terrorism by stating that anyone “sowing and 
creating a condition of widespread extraordinary fear and panic among the populace, in 
order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand shall be guilty of the 
crime of terrorism.”19 It outlines how terrorism is punishable under Philippine law, 
specifying that those convicted “shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) years of 
imprisonment, without the benefit of parole as provided for under Act No. 4103, 
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.”20 
Violations under the following provisions of the Revised Penal Code, Republic 
Acts and Presidential Decrees, constitute crimes of terrorism:  
a) Piracy and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters (Art. 122) 
b) Rebellion or insurrection (Art. 134) 
c) Coup d’etat, including acts committed by private persons (Art.134-a)  
d) Murder (Article 248) 
e) Kidnapping and serious illegal detention (Article 267) 
f) Crimes involving destruction (Article 324) 
g) Law on arson (PD 1613) 
h) Toxic substances and hazardous nuclear waste (RA 6969) 
i) Atomic energy regulation and liability (RA 5207) 
j) Anti-hijacking law (RA 6235) 
k) Anti-piracy and anti-highway robbery law (PD 532) 
l) Laws on illegal and unlawful possession, acquisition, manufacture, 
dealing, or disposition of firearms, ammunition or explosives (PD 
1866)21 
Chester Cabalza, a professor at the National Defense College of the Philippines, 
argues that there is no clear definition of terrorism in the Human Security Act of 2007. 
                                                 
18 Beckman, Comparative Legal Approaches to Homeland Security and Anti-Terrorism, 27. 
19 “Human Security Act of 2007,” Congress of the Philippines, accessed August 15, 2016, 
https://www.senate.gov.ph/republic_acts/ra%209372.pdf.  
20 Ibid.  
21 Ibid. 
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The legal definition as embodied in the law is vague and highly prone to abuse.22 He 
claims that the Human Security Act “is one of the most incoherent, disorganized, and 
disjointed laws the Philippine congress has ever passed.”23 He argues that the law has no 
clear standard objectives that will guide law enforcers; thus, it allows the law enforcers to 
have their own preference and interpretation of who are “engaged in terrorism or 
conspiracy to commit terrorism.”24 Moreover, he notes, the crimes enumerated by the 
Human Security Act are already punishable under the Revised Penal Code of the 
Philippines.  
On the other hand, creating normal criminal categories for terrorist activity has 
some real advantages in the Philippines, as elsewhere. According to Pauline E. Eadie, 
“practically and legally it is extremely difficult to differentiate between rebels, bandits, 
insurgents and kidnappers on the one hand and terrorists on the other. Consequently it 
may be pragmatic for the Philippines to prosecute offenders as criminals as opposed to 
terrorists.”25 
While it can be useful to prosecute terrorist acts as crime, still terrorism should be 
understood as distinct. Paul Wilkinson argues that terrorism can be a “weapons system”26 
used effectively by various non-state groups, regimes, and governments.27 Wilkinson 
emphasizes the idea that historically some governments and regimes used terror in a more 
brutal manner than non-state groups. States have more power and resources to implement 
their policies of terror to oppress and influence people for political ends. 
Wilkinson claims that it is incorrect to say that terrorism is synonymous with 
insurgency or guerilla warfare, and there is no compelling pattern to suggest that 
                                                 
22 Chester B. Cabalza, “Deconstructing Human Security in the Philippines,” Academia, 4−5, accessed 
April 17, 2016, https://www.academia.edu/2137055/Deconstructing_Human_Security_in_the_Philippines.  
23 Ibid. 
24 Ibid. 
25 Pauline E. Eadie, “Legislating for Terrorism: The Philippines’ Human Security Act 2007,” Journal 
of Terrorism Research 2, no. 3 (November 11, 2011): 30, http://jtr.st-
andrews.ac.uk/articles/10.15664/jtr.226/#. 
26 Paul Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response (Portland, OR: Frank 
Cass, 2001), 15. 
27 Ibid. 
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insurgency will evolve into a terrorist organization.28 He argues that terrorism is a 
“special method” of armed struggle and that it is possible to use terror or violence against 
civilians or non-combatants without engaging in a full-blown insurgency.29 Most 
insurgents believe that terrorism is just an auxiliary weapon, and any insurgency that 
relies solely on its effectiveness may ultimately prove counterproductive.30  
However, Alexander Aguirre points out that to achieve political ends, terror can 
be used as a tactic in combination with guerilla and conventional warfare.31 He argues 
that terrorism can be compatible with political movements, especially if these movements 
employ violence and terror as their main strategy or method to achieve their goals.32 
When this violence occurs, the international community can “tag rebels or insurgents as 
terrorists and criminals,” who must be condemned, confronted, and eradicated under the 
rules of law of civilized society.33  
2. Terrorism and Crime 
Tamara Makarenko illustrates the interaction—and interoperability—of crime and 
terror on a continuum in which, theoretically, crime and terror would converge at a 
central point.34 The author argues that it is hard to distinguish between profit- and 
ideology-based organizations because they exist on the same plane in which collaboration 
between criminals and terrorists can occur easily.35 Thus, the line that distinguishes 
politically and criminally motivated violence is becoming more blurred and complicated 
for policy makers and law enforcers alike to understand. 
                                                 
28 Wilkinson, Terrorism Versus Democracy: The Liberal State Response, 7. 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid., 7−8. 
31 Alexander Aguirre, “The Philippine Response to Terrorism,” Journal of Policing, Intelligence, and 
Counter-Terrorism 4, no. 1 (August 3, 2011): 48, DOI:10.1080/18335300.2009.9686923. 
32 Ibid., 48. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Tamara Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum: Tracing the Interplay Between Transnational 




According to Makarenko, there are four distinct points on the continuum of crime 
and terror. The first point of cooperation between organized crime and terrorism is the 
alliance. In this point, criminals and terrorists collaborate to acquire crucial skills, 
knowledge, and support critical to each group’s operational capabilities.36 This 
relationship may exist for the short or long term as long as both of them mutually benefit 
from such collaboration.37 (See Figure 1.) 
 
Figure 1.  The Crime-Terror Continuum.38 
On the second point, Makarenko asserts that the capacity of criminal and terrorist 
groups to employ both criminal and terror tactics for their operations constitutes the 
second component of the continuum.39 Organized crime groups use terror tactics against 
rival groups, and they engage in terrorism to force the government into negotiation and 
compromise.40 In the absence of foreign support, terrorist organizations tend to engage in 
illegal activities to support their operations and perhaps even the survival of the 
organization.41 Significantly, organized crime and terrorist groups often revert to their 
traditional organization and structure, rather than cooperating with each other to avoid 
                                                 
36 Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum,” 131−132. 
37 Ibid., 130. 
38 Source: Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum,” 131 
39 Makarenko, “The Crime-Terror Continuum,” 133−134. 
40 Ibid.  
41 Ibid. 
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inherent problems of security and other threats of close alliances.42 Because members of 
criminal organizations are only motivated primarily by greed and personal gain, they tend 
to be weak and can be easily recruited by state security forces.  
Convergence is the next point on the continuum. Makarenko’s “convergent 
thesis” has both organized crime and terrorist groups becoming a unified entity, though 
they have the capacity to transform themselves into the opposite end of the continuum.43 
At this level, criminal and terrorist groups can be classified as “hybrids” with the capacity 
to shift into criminal or terroristic activities and forego their original aims and 
motivations.44  
The fourth and final point is the “black hole.”45 This level thrives in weak or 
failed states in which criminal and terrorist organizations have converged, a safe 
environment for them to conduct unrestricted operations.46 Two situations emerge amid 
the “black hole”47 syndrome: first, primary motivations focus on criminal objectives; and 
second, a “black hole state”48 emerges in which political and criminal hybrid 
organizations gain substantial political and economic control over a part of a territory or 
an entire country.49  
Similarly, Helena Carrapico, Daniela Irrena, and Bill Tupman argue that terrorists 
and criminals tend to cooperate to enhance their capabilities and learn important skills 
from each other.50 They assert that there are two debatable issues within academia with 
regard to the nexus of crime and terrorism. The first issue relates to the nature of “the 
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crime-terror nexus.”51 The authors claim that it is best explained by the concept of 
Makarenko’s crime-terror continuum. The second issue concerns the situation that allows 
proliferation of terror and crime alliances.52 They argue that the existence of political and 
economic instability, armed conflict, and weak institutions provide a conducive 
environment for the terrorists and criminals to thrive and maintain strong strategic 
alliances. 
Toros and Mavelli claim that there is an increased interest in understanding 
organized crime and how these illicit activities should be approached.53 They point out 
that, like terrorism, organized crime is essentially difficult to define because most 
scholars rest on the “I know it when I see it” approach.54 They support the argument that 
“terrorism is political violence” while organized crime is motivated by financial gains or 
lucrative aims.55  
To understand terrorism and crime fully, Steven Hutchinson and Pat O’Malley 
provide a compelling discussion about the links between terror and crime.56 They argue 
that there are some “predictors” regarding the types of criminal activity a terrorist group 
would engage in. Because of the terrorists’ political or ideological motivations, it is 
improbable that “organized crime and terrorist groups will foster a symbiotic 
cooperation.”57 Although cooperation between terrorist and organized crime groups can 
be beneficial for both parties, this will not last in the long term because both 
organizations still want to maintain their respective operational security. Hutchinson and 
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O’Malley claim that terrorist groups aim for publicity, which is totally opposite to some 
organized crime groups.58 
Where does the ASG fall on the continuum? Santiago Ballina, in his article “The 
Crime-Terror Continuum Revisited: A Model for the Study of Hybrid Criminal 
Organizations,” applies Makarenko’s continuum to two case studies: La Familia 
Michoacana and the ASG.59 Ballina claims that in the case of the evolution of the ASG, 
the key factor is internal in origin, tracing back to the cultural and social nature of the 
organization.60 
To understand the ASG, Ballina suggests a careful analysis of the group’s social 
and cultural background, which encompasses the broader context of the Tausug tribe and 
other ethnic minorities in the southern Philippines.61 According to Ballina, the strange 
characteristics of the ASG—“hybridity, fluid network configurations, and even the drive 
towards criminality”62—have been the result of the ASG’s unique cultural and social 
environment. With this, the author proposes that a three-dimensional model should be 
used because this model is a comprehensive analysis of clandestine organizations, 
comprised of ideology, profit, and social/cultural dimensions, which overlap with each 
other.63 See Figure 2. 
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Figure 2.  Ballina’s Three Dimensional Model.64 
Sam Mullins also argues that “terrorists and organized criminals share the same” 
or comparable systems of influence and organization, demonstrate the same type of 
behavior, and behave and interact with each other similarly.65 In addition, Mullins claims 
that terrorists and criminals have performed the same activities to achieve their 
objectives; as such, criminal skills are essential for a terrorist to survive and perform his 
tasks successfully.66 Mullins points out that crime and terrorism can be analyzed in three 
main dimensions: methods, motives, and profiles.67 Using these dimensions, Mullins 
explicitly compares some similarities and differences in crime and terrorism. Mullins and 
Makarenko share the same idea about the methodological similarities between organized 
crime and terrorism. They argue that both crime and terrorism have used similar tactics 
and capabilities in terms of intelligence, counterintelligence, targeting techniques, 
employment of networks, and adopting a cellular-type structure.68  
                                                 
64 Source: Ballina, “The Crime-Terror Continuum Revisited,” 131. 
65 Sam Mullins, “Parallels Between Crime and Terrorism: A Social Psychological Perspective,” 
Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 32, no. 9 (August 27, 2009): 816, DOI: 10.1080/10576100903109776. 




Although O’Brien’s work focuses on one case study, and specifically on 
kidnapping, he provides a decent explanation of the historical fluctuations between 
terrorism and criminal activities.69 He shows that the ASG provides a glimpse of how 
crime and terrorism intersect. O’Brien also supplies other frames of analysis to clearly 
understand these connections.70 
3. Financing Terror and Responses 
Any threat or nefarious organization around the world will not survive without 
money or sources of financing. Jennifer Hesterman claims that money and the source of 
financing are two crucial factors for any type of terrorist organization.71 The 
uninterrupted flow of funds is critically important for the operations and other critical 
requirements of the organization.72 Terrorist groups may use various methods to generate 
funds and acquire a steady flow of cash depending on the environment or country in 
which they operate. Groups can rely on the support of other states or engage in criminal 
activities domestically or through transnational crimes. In some cases, terrorist groups 
mask their financing by employing charitable organizations as conduits to receive 
donations from wealthy individuals sympathetic to their cause. This section highlights the 
arguments of Michael Freeman, Aurel Croissant, Daniel Barlow, and McKenzie O’Brien 
about financing terror. Freeman writes that every source of terrorist financing has its own 
distinct characteristics and is best explained by various criteria, while Croissant and 
Barlow argue about popular sources of financing terror and claim that every terror group 
has its own peculiarity when it comes to financing activities. On the other hand, O’Brien 
argues about the preferred methods of some terrorist organizations.  
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According to O’Brien, kidnapping has become one of the preferred methods of 
terrorist groups around the world.73 He points out that some rebel groups and other 
similar types of actors have engaged in this kind of criminal act to finance their 
organizational capabilities and operations. O’Brien’s argument about kidnapping is based 
on one case study, which is the ASG. Other studies about financing sources also claim 
that kidnapping seems to be popular among terrorist groups, especially those who employ 
criminal methods to acquire funds for the organization.74 Although Freeman does not 
specifically mention which method is most feasible for any terrorist organization, his 
theory of financing sources can provide a decent explanation why kidnapping has been 
one of the preferred means of financing terrorists.  
Croissant and Barlow provide a “comparative study of ten nations in Southeast 
Asia” to show how financing of terror is being done by terrorist groups in the region, and 
they examine responses of these nations to combat terrorism financing.75 They claim that 
financing activities of terrorist groups in the region have distinct identities from each 
other because each country has its own differences in terms of “nature, organization, 
motivations, and opportunities.”76 Based on the analysis of Croissant and Barlow, there 
are three most popular sources of financing terror in Southeast Asia: criminal activities, 
charities, and commercial activities. Freeman writes that these sources of financing can 
be categorized into four: “state sponsorship, illegal activities, legal activities, and popular 
support.”77 The general categories endorsed by Freeman are similar to the sources of 
terrorism financing claimed by Croissant and Barlow. They believe that criminal or 
illegal activities remain one of the critical sources of funds for a terrorist group. 
Basically, Freeman, Croissant, and Barlow have the same argument regarding the sources 
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of terrorism financing, but Croissant and Barlow provide more detailed discussion about 
state responses to counter terrorism financing. They argue that to counter terrorism 
financing, Southeast Asian countries’ responses fall under four different dimensions: 
“legal framework, administrative framework, variety of approaches, and evidence of 
enforcement.”78  
In “The Sources of Terrorist Financing: Theory and Typology,” Freeman argues 
that every terrorist organization has its own distinct method of financing sources; thus, he 
asserts that no single strategy can be applied to address the sources of financing.79 All 
countermeasures must be tailored to fit against a specific group and its method of 
financing.80 He claims that terrorists can always adapt to any kind of situation, and they 
can innovate and find other ways of financing. Freeman explores the primary reasons 
why terrorists have varying preferences about the sources of their financing.81 He argues 
that from the terrorist organization’s perspective, “there is no perfect source; each has 
advantages and disadvantages across the following six criteria: quantity, legitimacy, 
security, reliability, control, and simplicity.”82 He points out that although much has been 
written about terrorist financing, most research only focuses on some specific case 
studies of terrorist organizations or just discusses viable solutions to disrupt their 
financing. None of these studies address the critical question of why terrorist groups’ 
preferences vary as much as they do. Additionally, how do these organizations decide 
and consider which source of financing seems more feasible and attractive than others? 
Freeman explains the “six criteria” that can be used “across a typology of four 
previously mentioned primary types of terrorist financing: state sponsorship, illegal 
activity, legal activity, and popular support.”83 He explains that the first criterion is 
quantity, which simply means that a particular terrorist group becomes more effective 
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and stronger as it gains more resources. Terrorists always choose an option that brings 
more money for the organization. With more funds, they have more flexibility to conduct 
attacks, recruit more members, and protect themselves against state security forces. 
Additionally, these groups also use some of their funds to help the communities where 
they operate, while in return receiving protection and crucial intelligence from the 
populace.84 
The second criterion is legitimacy, which is very important for a terrorist group. 
This criterion must be established and justified from the very start in order for the 
terrorist organization to sustain its existence, win the support of the people, and attract 
more members to join the struggle.85 Legitimacy of the terrorist group’s strategies and 
tactics are equally important to gain popular support. Freeman claims that there are 
several ways in which tactical decisions about financial sources affect the legitimacy of 
the group.86 He mentions that one of these is avoiding illegitimate methods of acquiring 
funds, which can be counterproductive for the whole organization. Funds coming from a 
“broad support base” have been a good indicator of legitimacy. If members of the 
terrorist groups are utilizing funds for personal gains or engaging in corruption, it would 
undermine their legitimacy. In some cases, terrorists must seek financing sources that 
demonstrate and support their legitimacy, and they depart from corrupt practices within 
the organization.87 
Security, as the third criterion, pertains to the capacity of any terrorist 
organization to operate clandestinely and avoid efforts of state security forces to acquire 
crucial information and infiltrate the organization. Thus, a terrorist group has to choose a 
source of financing that will not compromise the security of the organization. 
Collaborating with organized crime groups not only draws unwanted attention from law 
enforcers and other counterterrorism units, it also creates a weak point where state forces 
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can infiltrate a terrorist organization.88 Most members of criminal organizations are 
easily turned because they have no strong convictions or ideology and are motivated by 
their personal interest and greed for money.89 
Reliability of financing sources is also important for the terrorist organization and 
is the fifth criterion. It means that the sources of financing are foreseeable and steady. 
Freeman claims that these features of financing “often depend on factors of geography 
and demographics.”90 For instance, in the case of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), in 
order to have a steady and reliable flow of revenue from drug trafficking, the group must 
be strategically situated near the trafficking route, or they must have access to the 
majority of the population who are drug users. This concept also applies to the FARC and 
the Taliban in connection with their drug smuggling activities.91 
The sixth criterion is control. Sources of financing can have an influence on the 
way a terrorist organization controls its members and operations. As Freeman argues, 
“money is often associated with influence and power.”92 He points out that if cell leaders 
of small units are allowed to make decisions regarding their own financing sources, 
senior leaders lose their command and control of the lower units. Thus, decentralization 
of fund management in an organization may result in less control over lower units, and 
lower units may commit acts not in line with the organization’s objectives. Some terrorist 
groups do not want to be indebted from the support of other states or private sponsors 
because these sponsors tend to influence their operations and influence them to do acts 
that are counterproductive or totally irrelevant to their cause.93 The last criterion is 
simplicity. It means that it is valuable to do something as simple as possible in terms of 
financing sources. Terrorist groups choose to employ methods that require 
unsophisticated skills and little effort but may result in gaining a steady flow of funds. It 
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is also important that the methods must incur lesser cost and be more desirable than other 
means.94 Freeman asserts that although terrorist groups have proven flexible and can find 
new ways of financing terror, several sources of financing have inherent weaknesses.95 
One of the countermeasures that he suggests is enhancement of states’ police and 
intelligence agencies’ capabilities and an active legal approach to put more pressure on 
terrorist groups. 
4. Approaches to Counterterrorism  
A multicultural study of various approaches to counter-terrorism provides 
significant lessons from each country’s successes and failures. The problem is that 
terrorism is multi-faceted and complex; thus, it also requires a multi-pronged approach. 
According to Maria Ressa, to address the root causes of the problems, all agencies and 
their leaders must depart from destructive behavior of internal rivalries and patronage 
politics of the organizations and institutions they belong to.96 The following sub-section 
will examine the various approaches and responses to counter terrorism in the United 
States, the United Kingdom, Israel, and Southeast Asian countries. Their respective 
experiences provide a model that integrates several approaches to combat international or 
domestic terrorist groups, of which some fluctuate from terrorism to organized crime to 
sustain their operations. 
a. The U.S. Approach 
The U.S. approach is to continue working in collaboration with other countries in 
order to counter terrorism globally. The main emphasis is to use force to destroy and 
disrupt Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Regimes that sponsor terrorists or provide safe-haven, 
such as the Taliban in Afghanistan, will be compelled to cease sponsoring terrorism or 
will be toppled if they persist in being uncooperative.97 This effort will leverage the 
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common understanding and goals to enhance each other’s capabilities and work together 
to have an integrated approach to counterterrorism. 
The United States assists its allies to improve and expand governance and 
collaborate with other partners to degrade the capabilities of terrorist organizations 
locally and globally.98 The National Strategy for Counterterrorism of 2011 has four 
important principles that guide the U.S. approach to terrorism and the Global War on 
Terror. These are “adhering to U.S. Core Values,” “building security partnerships,” 
“applying CT tools and capabilities appropriately,” and “building a culture of 
resilience.”99 The United States upholds these core values because they enhance the 
security of the nation and protect citizens against acts of terror. Additionally, these core 
values aim to achieve the following: “respect human rights, foster good governance, 
respect privacy and civil liberties, commit to security and transparency, and uphold the 
rules of law.”100 This strategy promotes strong and lasting collaborative partnerships with 
allied countries to eliminate and dismantle terrorist organizations and actively engage in 
counterterrorist activities that include intelligence sharing and joint training and 
operations. It also adopts active cooperation to counter violent extremism through 
appropriate community-based resilience programs.101 
Daniel Byman claims that the military approach is crucial to counterterrorism.102 
He argues that the primary role of the military is to defeat the enemies by force and to 
provide counterinsurgency or counterterrorism training to the allies. Dunn and Hassan 
criticize Bush’s counterterrorism strategy in Afghanistan, asserting that it lacked 
“political context” and was naïve.103 This strategy focuses on a model of traditional 
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counterterrorism response, which is employing a military approach to change the existing 
regime in Afghanistan.104 According to these authors, the United States did not address 
or identify the root causes of the problems. Either way, the military approach in 
Afghanistan appears to be ineffective. Focused military operations destroyed the capacity 
of the Taliban regime to sponsor terrorism and to be used as training ground of Al Qaeda. 
b. The British Approach 
Some countries use a holistic and comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism in 
which their response to the threat is through various measures and integration of all 
efforts of government institutions and agencies. David Bonner describes the United 
Kingdom’s holistic and comprehensive approach to counterterrorism by adopting 
appropriate measures to combat the threat particularly with respect to legal, economic, 
and political aspects.105 The response of the United Kingdom also involved strengthening 
bilateral and multi-lateral engagements with other nations, especially with the United 
States and the Republic of Ireland.106 Enhancement of the military and police intelligence 
and security of vital government installations were initiated as part of the military and 
police measures.107  
Byman writes that intelligence is one of the five fronts in counterterrorism, and he 
emphasizes the significance of close collaboration and cooperation with allies and other 
partners.108 Benjamin Netanyahu claims that one of the central problems in 
counterterrorism is the reluctance of the security services of one country to share 
information with other foreign services.109 The British approach also adopts the 
effectiveness to counterterrorism of enhanced intelligence cooperation and collaboration. 
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Establishing relationships and working closely with domestic and foreign counterparts 
helps “to predict, prevent, deter, and suppress acts of terrorism” and neutralize the threat 
groups.110 Cooperation and collaboration unite all efforts of those who are involved in 
the fight against terrorism. Enhancing bilateral and multi-lateral engagement strengthens 
border controls and sharing of intelligence.111 It helps in securing quality and essential 
information through regular intelligence exchange and conference between countries.112  
Since World War II, British military intelligence has been conducting joint 
intelligence operations among the tri-service. Several branches make up the British 
military intelligence. The British Army is the only service with an Intelligence Corps.113 
The Royal Navy and the Royal Air Force also have their own intelligence capabilities and 
assets to support the requirements of the British Army.114 In addition to this, military 
intelligence works closely with other secret services such as the Security Service (MI5), 
the Secret Intelligence Service (MI6), and the Signal Intelligence Service.115 In terms of 
counterterrorism, the military has only a supporting role in which they provide crucial 
intelligence to support other law enforcement agencies. In the British case, the 
collaboration of various government agencies is how they synchronized their efforts in 
line with their main strategy of “the four Ps: pursue, prevent, protect, and prepare.”116 
c. The Israeli Approach 
The Israeli approach relies on a war-fighting model that assumes “terrorism is an 
act of war.”117 As such, its approach responds aggressively through intelligence-driven 
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military operations.118 Clive Jones argues that Israel adopted a war-fighting model of 
counterterrorism against the threat posed by the al-Aqsa Intifada, which led to the 
resurgence of terrorist attacks. This outbreak resulted in the deaths of hundreds of 
innocent Israeli civilians.119 From 2000 to 2005, around 1,030 Israelis were killed by this 
violence related to the al-Aqsa Intifada.120 The Israeli government responded with a type 
of excessive military force, which they believed was most efficient and effective: the 
targeted killing operations.121 This method employed the accurate launching of missiles 
from fighter jets and helicopter gunships, use of explosive devices, or use of snipers.122  
Notably, targeted killings, as a military approach, led to the killing of senior 
leaders and other key personalities. Although this method has moral concerns and could 
instigate harsh retaliation from the terrorists, it disrupted the enemy’s plan and damaged 
their capability to conduct further attacks.123 Despite the brutality of this method, it 
received “wide public support in Israel.”124 
In “A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism,” Daniel 
Byman argues that the Israeli Intelligence Service has been admired for their “efficiency, 
skill, and seeming omniscience.”125 Although there are cases of bungled intelligence 
operations, they still did an impressive job of recruiting reliable informants and acquiring 
quality information against their target organizations. They also value the importance of 
sharing information and collaboration with other agencies, especially with the police and 
Israeli Defense Force (IDF).126 
                                                 
118 Pedahzur and Perliger, “The Consequences of Counterterrorist Policies in Israel,” 338. 
119 Clive Jones, “Israel and the Al-Aqsa Intifada: The Conceptzia of Terror,” in International 
Terrorism Post 9/11: Comparative Dynamics and Responses, ed. Asaf Siniver (NY: Routledge, 2012), 126. 
120 Jones, “Israel and the Al-Aqsa Intifada: The Conceptzia of Terror,” 129. 
121 Ibid., 133. 
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid., 134. 
124 Ibid. 
125 Daniel Byman, A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism (NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2011), 370−371. 
126 Ibid. 
 23 
Just like any country with serious concerns about terrorism, Byman claims, Israel 
is also affected by terrorism’s psychological power.127 Many Israelis alter the basic 
pattern of their daily lives, which may mean not using the bus or going out to eat or 
shopping at malls.128 Terror attacks, especially against innocent civilians, undermine the 
credibility and capacity of the government to ensure peace and security and to protect its 
citizens. Despite widespread terrorist attacks, Israelis remain confident in the capabilities 
of their government to counter the threat of terrorism.129 With this kind of popular 
support, the Israeli government involves the people in active and passive measures and 
encourages active participation of the community to join the fight in order to conquer 
their fear.130  
d. The Southeast Asian Approach 
Andrew Tan claims that Southeast Asian countries adopted holistic and 
comprehensive approaches and strategies to counterterrorism because the threat of 
terrorism in this region was multifaceted and emerged from a long history of self-
determination.131 He claims that Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines reap the benefits of bilateral and multilateral cooperation to strengthen 
political, economic, and security cooperation.132 For instance, after the 9/11 attacks, 
ASEAN countries issued a joint resolution in support of the UNSC Resolutions 
condemning terrorism and enhanced security and economic cooperation to combat the 
threat.133 Countries like Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines signed a counter-
terrorism treaty to strengthen border security and sharing of vital information in terms of 
border controls.134  
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In his book, The British War on Terror, Steve Hewitt claims that there are short- 
and long-term solutions to any violence posed by terrorism.135 He points out that long-
term solutions require bigger involvement of the government to provide comprehensive 
solutions to the root causes of the problem.136 Some Southeast Asian countries have 
employed the military approach, but they complement it with a comprehensive strategy, 
which involves political, economic, and social instruments to win the hearts and minds of 
the people.137 
According to Alexander Aguirre, the Philippine approach to terrorism is both 
offensive and defensive.138 He claims that to confront the threat posed by the terrorist 
groups, it is imperative to engage concerned agencies in order to address the political and 
socio-economic problems of affected areas where terrorism thrives. He suggests that a 
comprehensive response to terrorism should be an integration of efforts from all 
government agencies and institutions, and it must strengthen bilateral and multi-lateral 
cooperation with other countries to effectively address the underlying causes that breed 
terrorism and radical ideas. He claims that this response has the following features: 
 The strategy adopted is holistic or comprehensive, that is, to fight the 
armed component of terrorism, as well as address the underlying 
conditions that breed it; 
 All departments and agencies, including local government units, have 
been tasked and given a role in fighting terrorism, within their respective 
areas of competence; 
 The response covers all the phases of the development of terrorist acts 
(before the attack, during the attack and after the attack), with the 
corresponding countermeasures, namely: the proactive phase (prediction, 
prevention, and preparation), the reactive phase (counter-terrorism 
actions), and the post conflict or consequence management phase; 
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 The response also includes close coordination and cooperation with the 
international community in fighting terrorism.139 
According to Eusaquito Manalo, the Philippine response to terrorism “remains 
reactive, rather than decisive and strategic.”140 He argues that terrorism should not be 
confronted by a military solution alone or employ a war-fighting model to counter the 
threat posed by the terrorist groups. Manalo asserts that the problem of terrorism in the 
Philippines requires effective police measures since basically it is a problem of law and 
order.141 He points out that the successful linkages and alliances between local and 
foreign terrorist organizations and other lawless elements in Mindanao can be the results 
of the government’s incomplete strategy and lack of complete understanding of the root 
causes of the problems.  
D. POTENTIAL EXPLANATIONS AND HYPOTHESES 
Using Makarenko’s crime-terror continuum, I argue that the ASG is a hybrid 
organization that has the ability to transform either into a criminal or terrorist group. 
Criminal methods are very crucial for the group’s survival and operational capabilities. 
On the other hand, terrorist tactics are important for ASG’s criminal activities. I also 
hypothesize that this group’s criminal activities, especially kidnapping, transformed it 
into an organized crime group whose main motivation is financial gain. As a hybrid 
organization, the ASG will show characteristics of crime and terrorism. When this group 
shifts temporarily into criminal organization, its focus will be on crime at the expense of 
ideology or religion. The ASG’s transition to criminality could end its terrorism. 
E. RESEARCH DESIGN 
This paper presents a single case study of the ASG’s terrorist and criminal 
activities in the southern part of the Philippines, though some of the group’s terrorism 
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and illicit activities in central Mindanao will be also addressed to support the analysis of 
its networks and capabilities.   
I will investigate how the ASG evolved from an ethno-religious or ethno-
nationalist organization with terroristic tactics into an organized crime group. I will 
explore the compelling reasons why the ASG seems to be effective despite intense 
government military effort to defeat them. Finally, this study will analyze the implication 
and impact of downgrading this group into an organized crime group with regard to the 
Philippines’ current counterterrorism strategy as embodied in the AFP’s Internal Peace 
and Security Plan “Bayanihan.” 
This thesis aims to incorporate a broad mix of scholarly articles, as well as 
relevant documents from the Department of National Defense and Armed Forces of the 
Philippines. Some significant studies and reports about the ASG’s terroristic and criminal 
activities will be used as sources of accurate data regarding the trend and extent of their 
violence and crimes. Some online sources will also be used since this medium provides 
informative reports and documents about the criminal activities of the ASG. 
F. THESIS OVERVIEW AND DRAFT CHAPTER OUTLINE 
The first chapter of this thesis provides a brief background, including the 
definitions of terrorism, the crime-terror continuum, the ASG, and the holistic and 
comprehensive approach to counter-terrorism. This chapter will consist of the following 
sub-topics: major research questions, literature review, significance and goal of the study, 
potential explanations and hypothesis, research design and sources, and thesis overview. 
Chapter II presents the history and relevant background of the ASG. This chapter 
explains the ideology and leadership of the group. It also discusses the strength and 
capabilities of the group and explores the compelling factors why they evolved from an 
Islamic movement in the early 1990s into a terrorist group and then became a bandit 
group.  
Chapter III explains one by one the various points of Makarenko’s CTC and plots 
the ASG on the continuum. It will discuss definitions of organized crime and its 
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similarities and differences with terrorism. This chapter also presents an analysis of the 
ASG’s resilience. 
Chapter IV discusses the kidnapping activities of the ASG. Although this group 
has also been engaging in other criminal activities, the kidnap-for-ransom scheme is the 
most prominent and preferred method to amass millions of pesos. These illicit activities 
enable the group to procure powerful weapons and other essential equipment that boost 
its operational capabilities to confront government forces in the area. It will examine 
ASG’s motivations and factors that contributed to the relentless kidnappings in 
Zamboanga peninsula and provinces of Basilan and Sulu.  
Chapter V highlights the Philippine government’s strategy and approach in 
counter-terrorism. This chapter will examine the past and current counter-terrorism 
policy, inter-agency coordination, and joint intelligence cooperation in the Philippine 
bureaucracy. It is also important to consider the significant role played by the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines to counter terrorism. 
Finally, Chapter VI presents a conclusion and recommended solutions to combat 
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II. CASE STUDY: THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP 
On September 21, 2015, three foreign nationals and one Filipino were abducted 
from Samal Island, an island resort in Davao del Norte in the eastern part of Mindanao. 
The kidnap victims were John Ridsdel and Robert Hall, both Canadian; Kjartan 
Sekkingstad, a Norwegian; and Marites Flor, a Filipina.142 The four were staying at the 
Holiday Oceanview Samal Resort, where armed men abducted them using two motorized 
boats. After six months, the ASG posted a video clip on the Internet, showing the four 
kidnap victims pleading for their lives with armed men standing in the background.143 
According to the statement of John Ridsdel in a video clip posted in November 
2015, the ASG wanted US$21 million for each of the abductees as ransom.144 Around the 
first week of April, the ASG demanded a ransom of PHP300 million (US$6.3 million) for 
each kidnap victim to be paid on April 25—and threatened to kill the victims if no 
payment was made.145 On April 25, 2016, the ASG beheaded John Ridsdel; his severed 
head was recovered along the street of the municipality of Jolo, Sulu. Around the second 
week of June, Robert Hall was beheaded by the ASG, while Kjartan Sekkingstad was 
freed last September. A certain Abu Ramie, an alleged ASG spokesperson, claimed that 
they released Sekkingstad in exchange for a PHP30 million ransom payment.146 On June 
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24, 2016, Marites Flor was released by the ASG. She was left in front of the residence of 
Sulu Governor Abdusakur Tan II.147 
Even more recently, a series of kidnapping incidents occurred along the border in 
the south between the Philippines, Malaysia, and Indonesia. On March 29, 2016, 10 
Indonesian sailors were abducted in the waters off the southern Philippines.148 The ASG 
demanded a PHP50 million ransom for the release of these hostages.149 On May 1, 2016, 
the 10 Indonesian sailors were freed in Jolo, Sulu, dropped by unidentified men in front 
of the house of Sulu Governor Abdusakur Tan, Jr. The Indonesian employer of these 
tugboat crews allegedly paid a PHP50 million ransom to the ASG.150  
Similarly, on April 1, 2016, four Malaysian sailors were snatched along the 
territorial waters of Sempornah, Sabah, Malaysia.151 The ASG demanded RM30 Million 
(US$10 million) as ransom for the release of the sailors.152 On June 8, 2016, the captives 
were released by the ASG, but there was no confirmation from either the Philippine or 
the Malaysian government that any ransom was paid for their release.153  
The funds obtained from the ASG’s illicit activities were used for the 
procurement of powerful weapons and other essential equipment, which enhanced its 
operational capabilities. It is also important to note that this group had intensified 
kidnapping activities by operating beyond its traditional area of operations and staged 
daring and successful cross-border kidnappings. Ransoming hostages is significantly 
important for the ASG as a source of financing. 
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This chapter highlights the historical background of the ASG to include its 
ideology, leadership, organization, strength, and capabilities. It also explains the ASG’s 
employment of terrorism and crime to attain its objectives. This chapter argues that the 
ASG has become a hybrid organization that is fluctuating between terrorism and crime, 
depending on the prevailing situation on the ground. Although this group has been 
officially labeled as a terrorist organization in the Philippines and listed as a foreign 
terrorist organization by the U.S. Department of State, it has been shifting from terrorism 
to organized crime because of the personal interests of its sub-commanders and members. 
Furthermore, it has become a stronger and more lethal terrorist organization by 
employing criminal tactics for its terroristic activities.  
A. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP 
In the middle-1970s, Islamic fundamentalism started to grow in the Philippines. 
Through scholarship grants from groups in the Middle East—particularly in Libya, Iraq, 
and Saudi Arabia—this idea spread to Filipino Muslims. Several clerics in Central and 
Western Mindanao availed themselves of these grants. After years of studies, they 
returned to the Philippines and organized a group aimed at propagating radical Islam.154 
Two such students—the late Ustadz Abdurajak Abubakar Janjalani and Wahab 
Akbar—earned their master’s degrees in Egypt and Syria, respectively. When they 
returned to the Philippines, the two joined the Muslim fundamentalist movement, Al 
Islamic Tabligh, which had been active in their home province of Basilan.155 Although 
there was no concrete evidence to substantiate Janjalani’s activities and movements in the 
Middle East, many believed that he travelled to different Muslim countries and met 
influential Muslim scholars and Imams, which greatly influenced him about radical 
Islamic teachings and thought. In 1988, he “went to Pakistan, where he studied the 
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Islamic revolution in Iran.”156 While in Pakistan, “he reportedly met and befriended 
Osama Bin Laden,” who helped him organize the ASG.157 
Janjalani, a former mujahideen in the Afghanistan war, founded the ASG in the 
early 1990s. Janjalani was greatly influenced by the teachings of Adbul Rasul Sayyaf, an 
Afghan resistance leader and Islamic professor, about Wahhabi theology. This knowledge 
led Janjalani to the concept of an Islamic state; thus, he formed an Islamic movement 
whose aim was to form an Islamic state in Mindanao.158 This movement grew in 
popularity and became known as the Abu Sayyaf Group, so named to honor his mentor. 
Many scholars mistranslated ASG to mean “Bearer of the Sword,” but “Abu Sayyaf” 
really means in Arabic, “Father of the Swordsman.”159  
To get financial support from other terrorist groups in the Middle East, Janjalani 
temporarily renamed the group as Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah160 (AHAI) in 1994 to 
emphasize the group’s original vision, which is to establish a “highly organized, 
systematic, and disciplined” organization of Islamic fighters.161 It is also believed that the 
International Islamic Relief Organization162 (IIRO) had provided financial support to the 
AHAI.163 The ASG established associations with Al Qaeda in the 1990s when Janjalani 
                                                 
156 Rommel Banlaoi, Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah: Essays on the Abu Sayyaf Group, 3rd ed. (Quezon 
City: Philippine Institute for Peace, Violence, and Terrorism Research, 2012), 52−53. 
157 Ibid. 
158 Banlaoi, Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah, 15. 
159 Garret Atkinson, “ASG: The Father of the Swordsman,” American Security Project, March 2012, 
1, https://www.americansecurityproject.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/03/Abu-Sayyaf-The-Father-of-the-
Swordsman.pdf.  
160 Al Harakatul Al Islamiyah−Founded by Abdurajak Janjalani in 1993 as an Islamic Movement 
when he and his other followers officially decided to break away from the Moro National Liberation Front 
and became a new group of Mujahideen. 
161 Banlaoi, Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah, 34. 
162 This organization was created in 1978 by the Muslim World League and is currently based in 
Saudi Arabia. It collects “donations, zakat, and sadaqah” to provide socio-economic assistance to 
“Muslims in war-torn and disaster-affected areas.” In 2006, the U.S. Department of the Treasury tagged 
IIRO branches in the Philippines and Indonesia as terrorist front organizations. Source: Berkeley Center for 
Religion, Peace, and World Affairs, https://berkleycenter.georgetown.edu/organizations/international-
islamic-relief-organization.  
163 Banlaoi, Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah, 17. 
 33 
met Bin Laden while in Peshawar, Pakistan. Janjalani also established links and became 
closely associated with Ramzi Yousef of Al Qaeda.164 
The Mujahideen Commando Freedom Fighters (MCFF) was the origin of the 
ASG.165 Banlaoi claims that this response is a reaction to the alleged atrocities committed 
against Muslims in the Philippines.166 This group attracted several members in the 
provinces of Basilan, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, and some parts of the Zamboanga peninsula.167 
In 1991, the ASG split from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) because of the 
latter’s failure to advance the group’s main goal of having “a separate and independent 
Islamic State in the southern Philippines.”168  
The ASG believes that peace talk and political settlement with the Philippine 
government are not the solution for the apparent oppression, economic marginalization, 
and injustices against the Filipino Muslims.169 For the ASG, the peace agreement 
between the MNLF and the Philippine government was a “betrayal of four centuries of 
struggle of the Bangsamoro170 people.”171 Abuza claims that in the early years of 
separation, the ASG attempted to sabotage the ongoing talks between the MNLF and the 
Philippine government.172 The group was tagged as a terrorist organization when it 
bombed M/V Doulos, a Christian missionary ship, docked at the Zamboanga City port.173 
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Then, from 1993 to 1995, the ASG began abducting locals and foreign nationals to 
include an American missionary and 11 Filipino tourists.174 
Although the ASG had been involved in several kidnapping activities, it remains 
and continues to be an Islamic terrorist organization. Banlaoi argues that this is an 
offshoot of the 9/11 attacks when the United States tagged the ASG as a foreign terrorist 
organization.175 He claims that the designation of the ASG is also a viable justification 
for the deployment of U.S. troops in Mindanao to assist and train the Armed Forces of the 
Philippines in counterterrorism.176 Arguably, the United States intends to protect its 
interests and maintain its influence in the Philippines. Khadafy Janjalani tried to revive 
the ASG by returning it to its roots as a genuine Islamic movement and employing 
terrorism and other forms of violence as its political weapon.177 When Galib Andang, an 
ASG sub-commander in Sulu, was captured in 2004, the ASG began its series of 
bombing attacks and disregarded for a while its KFR activities.178  
Zack Fellman argues that the death of Andang allowed Janjalani, with the support 
of other radical sub-commanders, to control the entire organization and redirect its efforts 
to the main political goal of the group—to form an Islamic State in Mindanao.179 He 
claims that two key bomb experts of Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), Umar Patek and Dulmatin, 
went to the southern Philippines and linked with the ASG. While seeking refuge with the 
ASG, Patek and Dulmatin trained several ASG members in bomb-making techniques.180  
These linkages of the ASG and JI led to a series of terrorist attacks in the 
Philippines: the bombing of the Davao International Airport in 2003, the bombing of 
Super Ferry 14 in 2004, and the bus bombing during Valentine’s Day in 2005. More than 
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150 persons were killed in these incidents and hundreds more were wounded.181 These 
terrorist attacks demonstrated that the ASG as a genuine terrorist group, motivated by its 
political and religious agenda, which has the capability of conducting terrorist attacks 
outside of its traditional area of operations. 
While the ASG’s strength has been diminished drastically—to not more than 400 
combatants this year—it can still conduct violent attacks because of its capacity to arouse 
strong local support from the Muslim population.182 According to Gracia Burnham and 
Dean Merrill, a former ASG hostage and author of In the Presence of My Enemies, the 
ASG had several supporters from different villages in far-flung and mountainous areas of 
Sulu, which made it harder for the AFP to conduct pursuit operations.183 Zachary Abuza 
claims that the ASG has emerged as “a serious security threat to the Philippines” and 
arguably a threat for peace and security in the region.184 It is one of the smallest and 
arguably the most radical and dangerous terrorist group in the Philippines, and is known 
to have strong Al Qaeda and JI links. The ASG forged alliances with some MILF 
members and became a critical partner for JI.185 This group had also linked with Misuari 
Group members or armed men loyal to MNLF leader Nur Misuari, who oftentimes act as 
mercenaries or provide sanctuary for the group in exchange for payment.186 Ferdinand 
Napuli claims that the ASG offered high-powered firearms and monetary rewards for 
potential young recruits to build up its ranks.187  
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B. STRENGTH AND CAPABILITIES 
The various sub-groups of ASG or other lawless elements can still forge tactical 
alliances during the conduct of operations and criminal activities.188 However, it is not a 
tactical concern for the ASG if they operate as one big group or independently; this group 
has the capability of staging small-unit and “high-impact terrorist attacks” not only in 
Zamboanga Peninsula, Basilan, and Sulu but also in other parts of the country.189 
The ASG is also capable of employing guerilla tactics. The ASG can pin down a 
unit up to company size, typically when troops are ambushed in a pre-designated killing 
zone.190 According to Banlaoi, “one important strength of the ASG, despite its small 
number, is its superb ability to solicit local support.”191 He also claims that one purpose 
of the ASG’s kidnapping activities and other criminal acts is to acquire a huge amount of 
money in order “to build up its manpower and help the local communities.” In return, 
these communities will provide protection and serve as safe haven for the terrorists.192 
These ASG-controlled communities also provide crucial logistical support—firearms, 
explosives, and ammunitions.193 
When the ASG is engaged in its area of operation, it has a “superb capability” to 
support besieged members in a short period of time.194 The ASG is extremely effective in 
its traditional areas of operation, particularly in Basilan and Sulu Provinces, because of 
its mastery of the terrain and crucial support from other armed elements operating within 
the area.195 More reinforcements are expected when the engagement area is near Muslim 
villages or Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) and Moro Islamic Liberation Front 
                                                 
188 Banlaoi, Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah, 38−42. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Intelligence and Security Group, Special Report: Assessing ASG’s Capabilities and 
Vulnerabilities,” (Taguig City, May 4, 2016), 5.  
191 Banlaoi, Al-Harakatul Al-Islamiyah, 43. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Ibid., 54. 
195 Ibid., 54−55. 
 37 
(MILF) camps.196 Although the ASG has no direct links with other armed groups or 
secessionist movements, most members of the group have relatives either in the MILF or 
MNLF.197 Because of tribal, religious, and cultural factors, they may help each other and 
fight one common enemy. Banlaoi argues that these alliances can be established by 
examining the fact that some ASG members are disgruntled members of either the MNLF 
or MILF.198  
According to former Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Criminal 
Investigation and Detection Group, Police Chief Superintendent Rodolfo Mendoza, “the 
alliance between ASG and the MNLF were formed years ago.”199 With regard to the 
ASG linkages with the MILF, Thomas McKenna argues that it is probable that some 
disgruntled MILF fighters had joined the ASG, and he asserts that “the ASG may be best 
viewed as a direct challenge to both the MILF and MNLF, not as an adjunct.”200 While it 
may or may not be true that these groups have direct links with each other, there are some 
enterprising Muslims residing near or within the engagement area who have joined and 
will join the firefight “purposely to acquire firearms and ammunitions left by government 
troops’ casualties.”201 
C. IDEOLOGY, OBJECTIVES, AND LEADERSHIP 
Contrary to popular belief and some media reports, “the ASG is not a 
homogenous organization.”202 This organization is a “highly factionalized group of 
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radical Muslim terrorists.”203 More exactly, the ASG adopts and operates in semi-
autonomous sub-groups, with the bulk of its forces based in Sulu and Basilan provinces, 
and to a lesser extent, in Zamboanga City and Tawi-Tawi province.204 In this kind of 
organizational set-up, sub-leaders have full command and control over their respective 
operations, particularly in the conduct of atrocities and in the formation of new and 
smaller sub-groups.205  
The vision of Abdurajak Janjalani when he formed the ASG was to establish a 
“highly organized, systematized, and disciplined organization.”206 To achieve his vision, 
he recruited young, passionate, and “highly educated Muslim leaders who had studied 
Islamic theology in Saudi Arabia, Libya, Pakistan, and Egypt.”207 Janjalani’s vision of a 
truly organized Islamic resistance movement has an Islamic Executive Council (IEC) that 
serves as the main planning and execution body of the ASG. This council is composed of 
15 Amirs.208 Under the IEC are two special committees. 
In 1998, combined forces of the military and the police killed Abdurajak 
Janjalani. This event caused a crumbling of the ASG’s organization and created a 
leadership vacuum. The original organizational structure envisioned by Janjalani was 
short-lived.209 With no overall leader that would steer and control the organization, 
discontent grew among its original members, and it “became [a] mere network of various 
armed groups with their own respective Amirs leading and controlling their own loyal 
followers.”210 See Figure 3. 
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Figure 3.  ASG Organization Envisioned by Abdurajak Janjalani.211  
The death of Abdurajak Janjalani in 1998 further “aggravated the factionalization 
of the ASG.”212 The appointment of Khadafy Janjalani, Abdurajak’s younger brother, as 
the next supreme leader of the ASG did not entirely resolve the problem of disunity 
within the group because “the young Janjalani did not have the ideological zeal and 
leadership charisma of his older brother.”213 
The main goal of the ASG is to establish an “independent Islamic Theocratic 
State of Mindanao,” where Muslims would “follow Islam in its purest and strictest 
form.”214 De Castro claims that this group has tried to combine ethno-religious and 
ethno-nationalistic ideology with its rampant KFR (Kidnap-for-Ransom) activities. 
According to Garrett Atkinson, the primary reason for the formation of the ASG is to 
seek justice for all oppressed Muslims in Mindanao.215 Atkinson claims that Janjalani 
was immensely motivated by Wahhabi Islam because of his religious education and 
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radicalization in the Middle East. This primary goal implies a radical view that an Islamic 
caliphate in Mindanao can only be achieved through armed struggle. The ASG aimed to 
form a social and political system similar to the Islamic Republic of Iran that is free from 
infidels or non-believers in Islam.216 To achieve this goal, each member of the ASG must 
attain the highest level of religious and political commitment through a rigid process of 
radicalization.217 
Banlaoi claims, “The ASG has two major factions operating autonomously in 
Basilan and Sulu provinces of southern Mindanao.”218 It is important to note that “the 
Basilan and Sulu factions of the ASG are also factionalized.”219 It has no devoted leader 
on whom its members could rely for their survival.220 Different sub-groups of the ASG 
“have mixed objectives, from Islamic fundamentalism to plain banditry.”221  
Some ASG sub-commanders are more interested in money through kidnapping 
activities, rather than the “idea of a separate Islamic state.”222 Because of the huge 
financial gains from KFR operations, some lawless elements in the southern Philippines 
want to have an alliance with the ASG for prestige and financial reasons.223 Luke Gerdes, 
Kristine Ringler, and Barbara Autin claim that the ASG can be a true extremist 
movement and continue to be a strategic threat in Southeast Asia.224 They also stress that 
this group has become a group of criminals with no strategic goals and ideology other 
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than creating an environment of fear and insecurity in the region through various forms of 
banditry and other forms of criminal activities.225 
D. EVOLUTION OF THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP FROM TERRORISM TO 
ORGANIZED CRIME 
From an Islamic Movement in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the ASG became 
known in the Philippines as a bandit group because of its immense involvement in 
criminal activities, particularly in kidnapping and extortions activities. During this period, 
it also perpetrated several bombings and other violent attacks targeting innocent civilians 
and government troops. When financial support from Al Qaeda was cut off due to the 
discovery of the clandestine operations of Mohammed Jamal Khalifa, the brother in law 
of Osama Bin Laden, in the Philippines, the ASG resorted to KFR as a primary means of 
acquiring crucial resources for the survival of the organization. Since then, the ASG has 
actively engaged in KFR as its major source of funds because support from international 
terrorist organizations has been limited due to extensive counterterrorism measures of the 
Philippine government in collaboration with its regional partners and other allies. 
In 2006, the ASG again fluctuated between terrorism and crime and adopted 
criminal methods to pursue its objectives. The Philippine government’s successful 
counterterrorism measures coupled with focused military operations led to the arrest and 
neutralization of key ASG leaders and members.226 Notable in this effort was the 
neutralization of its Amir, Khadafy Janjalani. Another key sub-commander in Sulu, Jainal 
Antel Sali, was killed through intelligence-driven military operations. This setback led to 
the drastic weakening of the ASG in terms of strength and capability to conduct terrorist 
attacks. The death of Khadafy Janjalani created an internal rift that further worsened 
relationship among its sub-commanders. The ASG cleverly recovered from this setback, 
however, when it unleashed a series of KFR activities from 2008 until 2011. The ASG 
amassed millions of dollars from these operations, which lured young Muslims to join the 
group. 
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E. CONCLUSION 
Despite its small size and mostly operating in southern Mindanao, the ASG 
remains the most brutal terrorist organization in the Philippines. In the absence of foreign 
funding from foreign terrorist organizations, the ASG has been changing its strategies 
and tactics and becoming more resilient. The ASG’s employment of combined terrorist 
and criminal methods makes this group more resilient. It also enjoys a robust support 
network, alliances with other lawless elements and threat groups, and collaboration with 
foreign terrorists. Through its aggressive and effective criminal activities, principally 
kidnap for ransom, the ASG successfully generates funds for its sustenance as well as its 
terrorist and criminal operations. Although the military approach may decimate this 
group, it seems ineffective to prevent further terrorist attacks or more specifically curb its 
KFR operations. Facing a hybrid organization, the Philippine government must consider 
as well a hybrid response that comprises a balanced application of criminal and military 
approaches. It is important, however, that comprehensive political and socio-economic 
measures must be instituted to deter others from joining the ASG and to prevent future 




III. THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP’S PLACE ON THE CRIME-
TERROR CONTINUUM 
In 2004, according to Kofi Annan, a former UN Secretary-General, organized 
crime groups have evolved and are continuously adapting in “today’s globalized 
economy and sophisticated technology,” but the integrated efforts—intelligence sharing 
and joint law enforcement operations—of democracies remain “fragmented” and current 
measures are almost obsolete.227 Mitchel Roth and Murat Sever have long agreed that 
terrorist organizations have used criminal methods and relentlessly engage in various 
criminal activities.228 Roth and Sever pose one important question, however: “When does 
a criminal enterprise become a terrorist group or vice versa?”229 They claim that various 
government officials and police organizations have been dodging the issue about the 
definition and label of terrorism and organized crime.230 Many security experts 
characterize these groups based on one particular criterion, namely whether they are 
driven by their political or economic goals.231  
Knowing and understanding the definitions of terrorism and organized crime can 
be helpful and crucial for the Philippine government to come up with effective 
approaches and responses against a hybrid organization—the ASG. As Banlaoi points 
out, the ASG has mutated into a “hybrid violent group.”232 It is incorrect to view this 
organization as an ordinary criminal group or genuine terrorist group because it has 
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shifted into a “dubious multiple character” that demonstrates the attitude of a brutal 
criminal group and dangerous behavior of a terrorist organization.233 
This chapter argues that the ASG has reached the first three phases—Alliances, 
Operational Motivations, Convergence—of Makarenko’s CTC model. This CTC model 
illustrates the interaction—and interoperability—of crime and terror on a continuum, 
which theoretically explains the convergence of crime and terror at a central point.234 
This chapter is organized as follows: First, it highlights various definitions of organized 
crime and some significant similarities and differences as compared with terrorism, but 
this section deals more on organized crime since several definitions of terrorism have 
been discussed in Chapter I. Second, it outlines and explains one by one the four points of 
the continuum—Alliances, Operational Motivations, Convergence, and the “Black Hole.” 
Third, it discusses the case of the ASG and considers its position on the Crime-Terror 
Continuum. Finally, this chapter highlights some significant sources of the ASG’s 
resilience. 
A. ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORISM: A COMPARISON 
Defining exactly what organized crime is, like terrorism, arouses debate among 
security experts and lawmakers alike.235 Jay Albanese defines organized crime as a 
“continuing criminal enterprise that rationally works to profit from illegal activities [and 
whose] continuing existence is maintained through the use of force, threats, monopoly 
control, and/or the corruption of public officials.”236 For the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), organized crime is defined as follows: 
Any group having some manner of a formalized structure and whose 
primary objective is to obtain money through illegal activities. Such 
groups maintain their position through the use of actual or threatened 
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violence, corrupt public officials, graft, or extortion, and generally have a 
significant impact on the people in their locales, region, or the country as a 
whole.237 
The European Union’s criminal intelligence agency defines organized crime as 
“having as its central goal, the pursuit of profit and/or power.”238 This definition suggests 
that power is an independent and separate goal from profit, which clearly demonstrates 
that the distinction between terrorism and organized crime critically rests on how scholars 
understand the nature of politics.239 
Annan argues that organized crime is a global challenge and criminal 
organizations have taken advantage of “globalized economy and the technology that goes 
with it.”240 Each member state of the UN must exploit the same factors—“openness and 
opportunities of globalization”—being used by these criminal organizations to conduct 
crimes and other violent activities, which explicitly and gravely violate human rights.241 
Annan points out that “if crime crosses borders, so must law enforcement.”242 He claims 
that if criminal organizations mock the laws of civilized nations, then those “who defend 
it cannot limit themselves to purely national means.”243 In December 2000, the UN 
ratified “United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and the 
Protocols Thereto” as a tool and augmentation in combating transnational crime. This 
Protocol defined organized crime as: 
A structured group of three or more persons, existing for a period of time 
and acting in concert with the aim of committing one or more serious 
crimes or offences [an offence punishable by a maximum deprivation of 
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liberty of at least four years or more serious penalty]…in order to obtain, 
directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.244 
As articulated in this Protocol, organized crime can be classified as transnational 
if four conditions are met:  
It is committed in more than one state; in one state but a substantial part of 
its preparation, planning, direction or control takes place in another state; 
in one state but involves an organized criminal group that engages in 
criminal activities in more than one state; or in one state but has 
substantial effects in another state.245  
Jennifer Hesterman asserts that the UN Protocol, also known as the “Palermo 
Convention,” provided a universally accepted binding document that address 
transnational organized crime, and it proposes globally accepted definition of debatable 
term such as “trafficking, confiscation, and organized crime.”246  
On the other hand, Howard Abadinsky suggests another contentious issue about 
the definition of organized crime. He argues that conventional crime is different from 
organized crime, and one variable that distinguish them from each other is the 
“perpetuity.”247 To illustrate this point, Abadinsky compares Jesse James with the Al 
Capone case: both of them, criminal gangs. The Jesse Games Gang, which is considered 
a conventional crime group, ended in 1882 when its leader died, while Al Capone’s 
imprisonment and death did not keep the organized crime group to which he belonged—
the U.S. mafia—from surviving into the 21st century. Abadinsky suggests eight attributes 
that constitute organized crime: “1) has no political goals; 2) is hierarchical; 3) has a 
limited or exclusive membership; 4) constitutes a unique subculture; 5) perpetuates 
themselves; 6) exhibits a willingness to use illegal violence; 7) is monopolistic; 8) is 
governed by explicit rules and regulations.”248 
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Both terrorism and crime employ and benefit from illegal activities, and they tend 
to have similar structures that make them more effective and efficient as an organization. 
Significantly, organized crime has been a global concern that requires a collective 
response of various nations. Criminal organizations cross borders and take advantage of 
the concept of “open borders and free markets” among democracies.249 Criminals have 
no political objectives; they use intimidation and violence for money, which they, like 
any terrorist organization, must have in order to survive. 
Hesterman writes that “the lifeblood of any nefarious organization”—criminals or 
terrorists—is money.250 Freeman claims that “terrorism costs money,” and without 
financial mechanisms, a terrorist organization cannot conduct and sustain its violent 
activities, recruit, and survive as a group.251 Terrorists are expert and well experienced in 
employing violent means to intimidate or coerce the populace, but just like any 
organization, they need money for their operational expenses.252 Kjell Hausken and 
Dipak Gupta claim that to attain continuous and steady sources of funds, terrorist groups 
must employ criminal methods, which, as a result, attract members who have no 
ideological motivations.253 These groups get extensively involved in criminal activities; 
thus, in the end, they lose their “ideological orientation” and “political support base.”254 
On the other hand, organized crime may opt to use terror tactics to coerce or intimidate 
the populace, but it is done to “achieve financial gains.”255  
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B. MAKARENKO’S CRIME-TERROR CONTINUUM 
This section illustrates the interaction and interoperability of terrorism and crime 
using Makarenko’s CTC. This continuum has four distinct phases, which can explain 
collaboration and alliance between terrorists and criminals, and it supports the hypothesis 
that the ASG has evolved into a hybrid organization. 
1. Alliance Formation 
The first phase in the continuum plane is alliance, which basically pertains to the 
collaboration between organized crime and terrorism. But organized crime and terrorist 
organizations have realized the inherent organizational and security problems present in 
alliances. These problems emanate from differences over “priorities and strategies, 
distrust, danger of defections, and possible competitions over turf and money.”256 To 
survive and continuously exist, a terrorist organization must always follow its “guiding 
principle” and must maintain its operational security by maintaining utmost secrecy in 
recruitment, preempting infiltration, and punishing disloyalty among its ranks.257 Thus, 
despite obvious advantages of alliances between crime and terrorist groups, this mutual 
relationship is only temporary and both organizations still intend to cut off any 
connection between them.258  
The alliance as the first relationship between organized crime and terrorism as 
illustrated in the Makarenko’s CTC is also called the “basic level of cooperation.”259 This 
kind of relationship may exist for a short or long period of time, depending on the mutual 
cooperation between criminal and terrorist groups.260 At this point of the continuum, the 
association between terrorists and criminals are growing stronger in order to learn and 
acquire certain skills from each other. Both of them intend to seek “expert knowledge” 
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such as “smuggling, money laundering, counterfeiting, or bomb-making techniques.”261 
Also, these alliances can occur to get “operational support” such as access to smuggling 
routes, procurement of firearms and explosives, and other important logistical 
supplies.262  
One good example of this kind of alliance is the case of the Albanian Mafia263 
and the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). The Albanian Mafia has been known as a 
notorious organized crime organization in terms of producing and trafficking drugs. This 
group has also been involved in other illegal and criminal activities such as “human 
trafficking, arms trading, contract killing, kidnapping, etc.”264 The terrorist perspective of 
the Albanian Mafia is best explained through an alliance with the KLA, a terrorist group 
that fought for the liberation of Kosovo from Serbia. To protect its organization and 
continuously survive as an organized crime organization, it must create an atmosphere of 
social and political instability, which further explains why it needs to maintain an alliance 
with a terrorist group.265  
As Makarenko claims, it is critical for any terrorist organization to achieve 
political unrest because this kind of unstable environment destroys the credibility and 
legitimacy of the central government in the eyes of the people it tries to protect and gain 
support from.266 See Figure 4. 
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Figure 4.  The Crime-Terror Continuum.267  
2. Operational Motivations 
The second component of the CTC—operational motivations—highlights how 
criminal groups employ terrorism as an operational tool, and in the same manner, how 
terrorist groups use criminal activities as an operational tool.268 It was only at the 
beginning of the 1990s that terrorist groups significantly employed criminal methods as 
the main source of financing for future operations.269 As Makarenko claims, the post-
Cold War era greatly affected the operational environment of several criminal and 
terrorist groups, and drove them to shift their operational priorities and focus.270 Megan 
Warshawsky writes that the collapse of the former USSR resulted in the creation of 
several failed states, and this incident was exploited by criminals and terrorists alike to 
their advantage.271 Organized crime and terrorist groups have been using weak or failing 
states as their safe haven and base of operations.272 This condition led organized crime 
groups to change the operational environment in some weak states, and since terrorist 
groups had lost financial support from their state sponsors, they began to engage actively 
in criminal activities.273  
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Although organized crime groups have employed terror to achieve their objectives 
and apparently engaged the political dimension, notably the main purpose for such 
actions was merely “to secure their operational environment.”274 Sustaining their illegal 
activities to maximize financial gains remains the primary motivation for these groups 
resorting to terror tactics. The series of car-bomb attacks carried out by the Italian Mafia 
in the 1990s is a good example of how criminal groups influence their operational 
environment. Although these terror attacks seem to give the lie to studies that hold that 
organized crime seeks to remain unnoticed by the public, the Italian Mafia, as one 
example, has realized the effectiveness of reaching a wider audience—through terroristic 
acts.275 Thus, after a series of attacks, terrorism as an operational tool “forced the 
[Italian] government into negotiation and compromise.”276  
On the other hand, many terrorist groups have opted to maximize the use of 
criminal methods as an operational tool to secure crucial funds for its future operations. 
The FARC277 is a terrorist organization that extensively engaged in the illegal drug trade. 
Other terrorist groups such as “Basque Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain, the 
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) in Turkey, and Sendero Luminoso in Peru” are all 
involved in various criminal activities.278 The ASG has relentlessly engaged in 
kidnapping, and these criminal activities have become its main source of funds.  
It is also important, however, to note that these above-mentioned terrorist groups 
still retain their political objectives, and criminal methods are only used to secure funds 
in order to achieve their political ends.279 From the 1990s to the present, many organized 
crime and terrorist groups have been observed to have “lost sight of their original 
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motivations and aims.”280 These groups have evolved into a hybrid organization in which 
their “motivations, organization, and operations” have converged. As Makarenko points 
out, this convergence makes it “analytically difficult” to distinguish where is the thin line 
that divides organized crime and terrorism.281 
3. Convergence 
The final point of the crime-terror continuum is the “convergence thesis.” At this 
level, both organized crime and terrorist groups have converged into a single entity, but 
they are still capable of transforming themselves into an entity that can be seen at the 
opposite end of the continuum.282 See Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5.  The Converging Threats.283  
At the “convergence thesis,” both criminal and terrorist groups have reached the 
category of “hybrid organizations” and acquire some hybrid characteristics.284 Thus, both 
criminal and terrorist groups have now the capacity to transform into crime or terrorism, 
and totally change their “aims and motivations” as an organization. In this case, both 
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criminal and terrorist groups have departed from their original identity of political or 
criminal entities.285  
In “New Age of Terrorism,” Brian Michael Jenkins argues that terrorists are not 
“monolithic,” which means that their actions are shaped by “culture, ideology, and 
politics.”286 He claims that terrorist groups are capable of innovating tactics, exploiting 
the latest technology, and learning from other organizations’ successes.287 As Makarenko 
asserts, terrorist groups can shift their operations to crime because of financial gains, 
while organized crime groups can turn themselves into terrorists to gain “political 
leverage” and disrupt the judicial and legislative process of the government.288 With this, 
Makarenko offers two independent components of the convergence thesis: political crime 
and commercial terrorism. Although both of them are independent variables, they are still 
related to each other as explained below: 
a. Political Crime 
Political crime pertains to a particular organized crime group that seeks political 
objectives, and at the same time has been motivated by the financial or material gains of 
its actions. This category is further sub-divided into two parts.289 First, it encompasses 
criminal groups who employ terror tactics to further their political objectives by gearing 
their terroristic activities toward the disruption of the political or judicial processes of the 
country. These criminal groups exert much effort “to block anti-crime legislation” and 
gain political control through direct intervention in the political arena and activities of 
some government institutions.290  
The second category under the first component pertains to the capacity of a 
criminal organization to employ terror tactics to attain control or monopoly over 
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economic sectors and financial institutions of the state. In this case, however, the ultimate 
objective of a criminal organization is still “to gain political control over the states.” As 
Makarenko argues, in a modern era of free market and capitalist economy, economic 
strength is one of the crucial components of having a strong political power. The 
convergence of crime and terrorism in Albania is one good example of this political 
crime. Since the Albanian Mafia had been linked to “Pan-Albanian ideals, politics, 
military activities, and terrorism,” it procured arms and military equipment for the 
KLA.291 Additionally, members of the Albanian criminal and terrorist groups have dual 
and interchangeable membership, and they share the same recruitment base to beef up 
their strength.292 
b. Commercial Terrorism 
The second component of the convergence thesis pertains to the active 
engagement of terrorist groups in criminal activities. In this category, terrorist 
organizations are no longer motivated by their political agenda, but they focus more on 
the financial rewards that they can get from various criminal activities.293 In commercial 
terrorism, terrorist groups still use their political rhetoric and ideologies to mask and 
justify their criminal activities from the public. A terrorist organization may not survive 
without the crucial support of the people, particularly those who are within their area of 
operations or controlled territories. This public support is critically important to 
manipulate and maintain terrorist support networks to enhance operational capabilities of 
the organization. For this reason those hybrids—falling under the complex identity of 
crime and terrorism—continue to exploit political grievances and portray plausible 
justifications for their purely criminal deeds.294 
Despite involvement in criminal activities, however, commercial terrorists still 
recognize the crucial role of using terrorism as a tool for two major reasons. First, 
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terrorism sways the government and law enforcement units to focus their investigation on 
the political aspects, rather than initiating criminal investigations after the attacks. 
Second, terror tactics serve as leverage against the threat posed by rival criminal 
groups.295 Some terrorist organizations demonstrate this kind of convergence in which 
they have evolved primarily as criminal groups; examples include the FARC, the ASG, 
and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan. These organizations are mostly involved in the 
drug trade, kidnapping, smuggling of arms and goods, and other illegal activities.296 
4. The “Black Hole” Thesis 
At this phase, both terrorists and criminals have successfully destabilized the 
political situation of a particular country and sway the popular support against the 
government. The final phase of Makarenko’s CTC model refers to a specific situation 
wherein weak or failed states become a suitable environment for the convergence of 
organized crime and terrorism. At this point in the continuum, an ideal and safe 
environment has been achieved by both criminals and terrorists for their violent, illegal, 
or unrestricted operations.297 As Makarenko argues, the “black hole” is the biggest threat 
to international security because at this level, political crime and commercial terrorism 
have reached a point wherein both organized crime and terrorist organizations “gained 
economic and political control over a state.”298 When this situation emerges, two types of 
situation will prevail. First, the “black hole” syndrome can trigger chaos, display 
characteristics of anarchy, and show signs of political instability that can lead and 
develop into failed states such as the case of Afghanistan.299  
Second, the “black hole” can create a “criminal state” such as North Korea. To 
protect the regime and secure their control and power, these nations extensively use terror 
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tactics. A sector of elite government officials arguably uses their power and position to 
maximize profits from various illegal and criminal activities.300 
C. THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP’S PLACE ON THE CRIME-TERROR 
CONTINUUM 
According to Antonio Maria Costa, former Executive Director of the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), “Organized crime has globalized and 
turned into one of the world’s foremost economic and armed powers.”301 UNODC also 
claims that, globally, organized crime and terrorism have been converging.302 Terrorist 
and criminal organizations are taking advantage of their “specialized skills and assets.”303 
This convergence paves the way for the emergence of hybrid organizations that 
demonstrate a remarkable relationship between criminals and terrorists. The ASG 
demonstrates this kind of mutation: from its roots as a mere Islamic Movement it evolved 
into a genuine terrorist organization, which has connections and support from some 
foreign terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and the regional terror group—Jemaah 
Islamiyah (JI) of Southeast Asia. Now, the ASG had been extensively involved in 
criminal activities, particularly in kidnapping, in collaboration and alliance with various 
criminal and lawless elements in the Southern Philippines. This section will discuss the 
mutation of the ASG that will be highlighted in the first three phases—Alliance, 
Operational Motivations, and Convergence—of Makarenko’s CTC model. 
1. Terrorism-Crime Period of the Abu Sayyaf Group 
The main goal of the ASG is to create an Islamic state in Mindanao, and this 
group realized that armed struggle and linkages with other foreign terrorist organizations 
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are crucial to this goal.304 The M/V Doulos incident marked the beginning of the ASG as 
one of the terrorist groups in Mindanao. This terrorist attack was publicly acknowledged 
by the ASG, and its popularity immediately spread in the Southern Philippines.305 Soon 
after the 9/11 attack in the United States, the ASG was listed as a foreign terrorist 
organization by the U.S. State Department.306 This designation led to a stronger 
cooperation and collaboration between the United States and the Philippines to combat 
terrorism, particularly the threat from the ASG. According to Linda Robinson, Patrick B. 
Johnston, and Gillian S. Oak, to defeat the ASG and its local and foreign affiliates, the 
Philippines must enhance its military capability in terms of intelligence gathering, 
training, and more-capable special units.307 
In this period of pure terrorism, the ASG perpetrated numerous notable terrorist 
attacks such as bombings, assassinations, mass executions, beheadings, and kidnappings. 
Atkinson claims that the most prominent signature of these atrocities was its “extreme 
ruthlessness and wanton disregard for life, especially those of Christians.”308  
The period of 1991 to 1995 was the initial terror campaign perpetrated by the 
ASG in which several high-profile terrorist attacks—mass killings, bombings, 
beheadings, and kidnappings—were executed as a way of introducing themselves as a 
“full-fledged terrorist group.”309 The “Ipil Massacre” was one of the worst attacks 
perpetrated by this group in collusion with some members of the MILF in 1995. In this 
incident, the ASG raided the municipality of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay Province, killing 
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80–100 innocent civilians, looting millions of pesos from commercial banks, and burning 
the center of the town.310  
As mentioned in Chapter 2, the ASG’s “bold and publicity-driven attacks” surged 
during its early years of formation, and the period 1995−2001 can be correctly 
categorized as a “period of banditry.”311 Although there were some notable terrorist 
attacks against innocent civilians during this period, the ASG changed its focus to 
kidnapping activities for monetary purposes.312 According to Banlaoi, some of the high-
profile kidnapping activities of the ASG can be categorized as “serious maritime terrorist 
attacks.”313 This group pronounced some explicit political objectives to justify its 
criminal activities. The ASG issued various demands such as “to recognize the 
establishment of the independent Islamic State in the Southern Philippines, to recognize 
alleged human rights violations against Filipino Muslims, and to protect the ancestral 
fishing areas in Mindanao.”314 For the period of 1991 to 2000, the ASG was credited 
with 378 terrorist attacks, which killed 288 people. This group also perpetrated 640 
incidents of kidnapping that involved 2,076 hostages.315 The ASG, however, also 
perpetrated several major terrorist attacks from 2001 to 2009 as enumerated below: 
 Pearl Farm Beach Resort kidnapping on 22 May 2001, involving 20 
hostages 
 Jehovah’s Witnesses kidnapping in August 2002 involving six members. 
Two of them were beheaded. 
 Zamboanga City Bombing in October 2002, killing an American soldier 
 Davao International Airport Bombing on 5 March 2003, killing 21 people 
and injuring 148 others 
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 Superferry 14 bombing on 24 February 2004, killing 116 people and 
injuring 300 others. This incident was regarded as the worst man-made 
disaster in Philippine waters since 9/11 and the worst terrorist attack in 
Asia since the 2002 Bali Bombing. 
 Valentine’s Day bombings on 14 February 2005 in Makati City, Davao 
City and General Santos City. These bombings resulted in the death of 11 
people and injury of 93 others. 
 The kidnapping of TV journalist Ces Drilon and her crew on 23 
September 2008 
 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) Kidnapping on 15 
January 2009, involving three personnel, and Sri Lankan Peace Worker 
Kidnapping on 13 February 2009316 
2. Period of Alliance with Lawless Elements and Other Threat Groups 
In the mid-1990s, the Philippines discovered that Al Qaeda was providing 
financial support to the ASG through the clandestine activities of Osama Bin Laden’s 
brother in law—Mohammed Jamal Khalifa.317 When the support of foreign terrorist 
organization stopped in the late 1990s, the ASG began its series of kidnapping 
operations. During this period, the ASG executed the daring kidnapping operations in 
Sipadan Island Resort of Sabah, Malaysia and the Dos Palmas Resort in Palawan. In 
2000, the ASG also perpetrated the highly publicized kidnapping of public elementary 
school teachers in Basilan.  
According to Professor Octavio Dinampo of Mindanao State University, who has 
the traumatic experience of having been an ASG hostage, the ASG’s main advantage is 
its “wider network of external groups.”318 He points out that this robust network with 
other lawless elements helped the ASG to successfully conduct kidnappings and evade 
pursuing government troops.319 From the ASG’s perspective, establishing an alliance 
with different criminal elements proved to be the best option, particularly at the tactical 
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level. This kind of alliance enhances each other’s operational capabilities, proficiencies, 
and skills in terms of conducting terrorist and criminal activities. When lawless elements 
successfully abducted its victim, this group will immediately transfer the hostages to the 
ASG, and in this case, the ASG will just send a team to pick up the hostages along the 
pre-designated point, which is normally somewhere along the coastline of Zamboanga 
Peninsula.320  
As Mayola claims, the ASG utilizes various cells of lawless elements as 
“workhorses,” and these criminal elements conduct surveillance and casing of 
prospective targets, to act as a take down or “snatch team,” to hide the hostages, to act as 
negotiators, and other essential tasks in kidnapping operations.321 In some cases of 
kidnapping, the ASG is allegedly involved in alliances with rogue elements of the MILF 
because of “familial or personal ties” between the members of the ASG and MILF.322  
3. Operational Tool Period 
According to Makarenko, history reveals that organized crime groups employ 
terror tactics in order to achieve their organizational objectives and goals.323 She claims 
that these criminal organizations, whether domestic or transnational groups, had 
extensively used terror tactics to further their ultimate aims.324 Regarding the case of 
some criminal elements operating in the area where the presence and strong influence of 
the ASG are known, these groups do not seem to be directly involved in terrorism or 
known to use terror tactics to harm innocent civilians. These criminal elements are not 
perpetrating bombing or mass killings of innocent civilians but, in a certain way, they are 
indirect accomplices to the terrorist attacks and other violent activities of the ASG.325  
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Because these groups’ principal motivation is money, they are more ardent in 
various illegal activities such as kidnapping, arms and drug trafficking, extortion, and 
gun-for-hire. These criminal organizations, however, could be tapped to procure firearms 
and explosives for the ASG. Since these lawless elements can easily blend in and roam 
around and have the mastery of urban operations, they are more efficient and effective in 
providing safe haven and logistical support for the ASG.  
On the other hand, the ASG benefits from this alliance with various criminal 
elements through sharing of knowledge, expertise, and techniques in conducting 
kidnapping operations. Criminal groups and lost commands of the MILF and MNLF 
seem to have perfected the conduct of illegal activities in Western Mindanao. Despite the 
presence of numerous military and police checkpoints coupled with a naval blockade off 
the waters of Zamboanga Peninsula, abduction continuous as a major concern and has 
failed to stop. Lawless elements are known to be good in this method of kidnapping 
wealthy Filipinos or foreigners in Zamboanga Peninsula. In the absence of foreign 
funding since the 9/11 attacks in the United States, the ASG has relied on criminal 
activities as its operational tool to acquire funds.326 Aside from this kidnapping spree, 
this group has also been involved in extortion in the form of zakat (a religious tax), arms 
smuggling, “counterfeiting of goods, illegal drug sales or serving as bodyguards for local 
politicians.”327 
D. SOURCES OF RESILIENCE 
The ASG’s operational resilience as a terrorist organization has largely been 
attributed to its robust support network, linkages with other threat groups for criminal 
activities, and protection from corrupt politicians.328 Furthermore, this group has a superb 
ability to recruit young Muslim fighters from sympathetic villages in Basilan, Sulu, and 
Tawi-Tawi Provinces through material incentives.329 Banlaoi claims that in the Sulu 
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Province alone, “46% or 115 of its total 251 villages are affected by the ASG, in Basilan, 
25% of its 187 villages are affected by ASG.”330 Moreover, he mentioned that ASG 
leaders have also “mastered the skills” of colluding with various lawless elements to 
conduct kidnappings and other criminal activities.331 He argues that the problems 
emanating from the ASG are an offshoot of long decades of conflict in the Southern 
Philippines. These “complex tensions” sprouted the collaboration of “criminal, political, 
and militant groups” with shared common objectives and goals for the betterment of 
Mindanao.332 
Some local politicians in Western Mindanao reportedly protected some leaders 
and members of the ASG because some of these politicians are also benefiting from the 
criminal and other illegal activities of the ASG.333 Based on the records and assessment 
of the PNP, prior to a national or local election, kidnapping incidents increased in 
Western Mindanao.334 Some local politicians allegedly financed kidnapping operations in 
collusion with the ASG to generate funds for their political ambition.335 These politicians 
also employed some members of the ASG as “part of their private militias.”336  
Although the ASG remains as a terrorist organization, however, some of its 
members have realized that it is far better to do kidnapping operations because of the 
utmost rewards that come with it, which are money and power.337 According to Banlaoi, 
some of its sub-commanders have become more interested or motivated in doing 
kidnapping operations than the promise of establishing a separate and independent 
Islamic state in Mindanao.338 The collusion and collaboration of the ASG with various 
lawless elements and some crooked politicians not only perpetuate the tensions and 
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violence in the southern part of Mindanao, but it has also become the primary source of 
resiliency of this terrorist organization.339 
E. CONCLUSION 
Although organized crime and terrorist organizations demonstrate some 
similarities and differences, it is hard to distinguish their unique characteristics in terms 
of crime and terrorism because in most cases, they are fused at various levels. As 
Makarenko concludes, most terrorist groups today do not always behave in a rational 
way; in some cases, their actions and behaviors can be unpredictable.340 As criminal and 
terrorist organizations operating in the southern part of Mindanao have mutated into a 
single entity or are known as “hybrid organizations,” the Philippine government must 
anticipate its strategy and be flexible and responsive to the changing security situation on 
the ground.341  
Makarenko’s CTC model is a good theoretical framework, which provides a 
better understanding of the complex relationship between organized crime and terrorist 
organizations. The ASG will continue to use criminal methods, particularly kidnapping, 
because it is the most practical avenue to secure funds for its operations and continuous 
survival. The alliance formed by the ASG with various lawless elements has proven 
crucial for its survival, and it will be a long-term relationship. Lawless elements and other 
criminal groups in the southern part of Mindanao provide not only additional armed 
members, but also expertise and critical operational support for future terrorist 
operations.  
Without money as the life blood of any organization and cessation of foreign 
funding from other international terrorist organizations, the ASG will remain a “hybrid 
organization” and will not forego strong alliances with lawless elements and other 
criminal groups in the Western part of Mindanao. Criminal activities will remain a potent 
weapon or operational tool of this group. The ASG had acquired millions of pesos from 
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its kidnapping activities; thus, abandoning these criminal acts may just create opposition 
and conflict among its sub-commanders and members. If money is the lifeblood of any 





IV. THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP’S KIDNAPPING ACTIVITIES 
James J.F. Forest claims that getting the exact data about kidnapping incidents 
globally is quite impossible to achieve because of the complexities of how governments 
and families of kidnap victims respond or handle the hostage situations.342 In most cases, 
details of the negotiations and ransom payments remain secret because in most countries, 
it is the prerogative of the victim’s families to seek or not seek the help of the authorities 
to resolve the situation. In most countries and as part of their counterterrorism measures, 
it is a state policy of no negotiation or concessions to any terrorist organization. In some 
cases, however, the government policy of no concession or no ransom payment may put 
the lives of the kidnap victims at risk.  
To clearly understand the main source of financing of the ASG, specifically the 
Kidnap-for-Ransom (KFR) operations, this chapter highlights and provides an in-depth 
analysis of the ASG’s kidnapping activities and trends from 2000 to 2014. It also outlines 
and explains the motivations and modus operandi of the group. Some of the factors that 
contribute to the relentless kidnappings are also discussed in this chapter. The period 
covered is sub-divided into six distinct periods and highlights some notable factors and 
explanations about the decline or surge of kidnapping incidents in Mindanao, especially 
in Zamboanga Peninsula, Basilan, and the Sulu Archipelago. Additionally, this section 
discusses the ASG’s motivations, ransom scheme, modus operandi, and significant 
factors that contribute to the relentless kidnappings in the southern part of Mindanao. 
A. ANALYSIS OF THE ABU SAYYAF GROUP’S KIDNAPPING TRENDS 
Because of the ASG’s desire to gain the attention of international terrorist 
organizations and other extremist groups and personalities, it embarked on a series of 
kidnappings, which explains the prevalence of kidnapping incidents from 1991 to 
1999.343 This period also explains why the majority of the victims were non-Muslims. 
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During this period, kidnapping activities served as the main source of funds of the ASG 
and its continued existence. In the same manner, the kidnappings allowed the group to 
project itself as a dedicated and genuine Islamic movement in the southern Philippines.344 
See Figure 6. 
 
Figure 6.  ASG Kidnapping Incidents 1991−1999.345  
From 2000 to 2014, an upsurge in ASG’s KFR activities led to a total of 225 
recorded incidents, with 623 kidnap victims. The group carried out both high-impact and 
small-scale kidnappings during this period, targeting locals as well as foreign nationals 
within and outside the group’s traditional areas of operations. See Figure 7. 
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Legend: KIDNAPPING – Pertains to the number of incidents or cases of abduction 
perpetrated by the ASG. NR OF KVs – Number of Kidnap Victims of the ASG.  
Figure 7.  ASG Kidnapping Incidents 2000−2014.346 
For 2000 to 2001, there was an increase in kidnapping incidents, which can be 
attributed to the death of the previous Amir, ASG founder Abdurajak Janjalani. Based on 
the assessment of the AFP, during this period, the international terrorist organizations, 
specifically Al Qaeda, cut their financial support to the ASG amid the death of the 
group’s founder.347 Also, this period was characterized by instability for the leadership of 
the ASG because some sub-commanders were aspiring to become Amir.348  
In this period, the ASG was heavily involved in kidnapping activities. In year 
2000−2001 alone, there were 142 incidents of kidnapping that resulted in the death of 16 
victims; all of them were attributed to the ASG.349 From 2000 to 2001, the ASG gained its 
notoriety in the conduct of kidnapping due to its involvement in the series of high-profile 
kidnapping activities in the towns of Sumisip and Lamitan, both of Basilan Province; Dos 
Palmas Beach Resort, Puerto Princesa, Palawan; and Sipadan Island, Sabah, Malaysia. In the 
town of Sumisip, Basilan, 60 public school teachers and children were abducted and used as 
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human shields by the ASG when they entered the town of Lamitan.350 In 2001, they 
embarked on a cross-border kidnapping where 21 tourists were abducted in Sipadan Island, 
Malaysia. Then later that year, despite intense military operations, the Philippine government 
was caught off-guard when the ASG abducted three Americans and 20 other tourists at the 
Dos Palmas Beach Resort in Palawan.351 See Figure 8. 
 
Figure 8.  ASG Kidnapping Trends (Focus on 2000−2001).352  
For 2002 to 2007, a drastic decline of kidnapping incidents was noted. This 
decline of kidnapping incidents was primarily attributed to the arrest and neutralization of 
some key personalities of the ASG. The intense military operations conducted by the 
AFP drove its key leaders and other sub-commanders to seek temporary protection and 
relief in central Mindanao.353 Also, during this period, the resurgence of bombing 
operations of the ASG was noted. During this period, the ASG was preoccupied with 
bombing operations, which was also a factor in the decline of kidnapping incidents.354 
ASG’s support teams in urban areas became preoccupied with procuring IED 
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components and casing their possible targets for bombing operations. These bombing 
operations were believed to be conducted in collaboration with other threat groups—JI, 
Rajah Solaiman Movement, MILF-Special Operations Group—and other lawless 
elements operating in the southern Philippines.355 See Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9.  ASG Kidnapping Trends (Focus on 2002−2007).356  
In 2008, however, resurgence in ASG-perpetrated KFR activities was noted. The 
sudden spike in kidnappings on that year may be attributed to the death of its key leaders, 
Khadaffy Janjalani and Jainal Antel Sali, in 2006 and 2007, respectively. The ensuing 
power vacuum caused the loss of a central leadership, which gave ASG sub-leaders a free 
hand to manage their operations. Consequently, small-scale kidnappings and “express 
kidnappings,”357 targeting local ordinary workers became rampant, especially in the 
group’s traditional areas of operation. The only high-profile kidnapping incident recorded 
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that year was the kidnapping of ABS-CBN correspondent Ces Drilon and two of her crew 
in Sulu on June 2008.358 See Figure 10. 
 
Figure 10.  ASG Kidnapping Trends (Focus on 2008).359  
For 2009 to 2011, kidnappings continued to be the trend, but this time, more 
affluent individuals and foreign nationals were the preferred targets of the ASG. Also, 
this period shows that the ASG was slowly improving its operational capabilities and 
support network in terms of conducting kidnapping operations.360 See Figure 11. 
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Figure 11.  ASG Kidnapping Trends (Focus on 2009−2011).361  
For 2012, this period recorded a decrease of ASG kidnapping, which can be 
attributed to the extended detention of several kidnap victims who were abducted in 2010 
and 2011. See Figure 12. 
 
Figure 12.  ASG Kidnapping Trends (Focus on 2012).362  
For 2013 to 2014, the ASG engaged in both small-scale and high-profile 
kidnappings. Based on the data obtained, some kidnapping incidents are not reported or 
                                                 
361 Source: Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, OJ2, ASG Kidnapping for Ransom 
Activities (Quezon City: IRAD, 2014). 
362 Ibid. 
 72 
recorded because some kidnap victims were released even before it came to the attention 
of the police. Sometimes relatives of the kidnap victims opted to stay silent and negotiate 
with the kidnappers without any help from the authorities. Small-scale kidnappings 
became the most favored scheme among the ASG and other lawless elements because 
negotiation would only last from a matter of hours to a few days. The ransom payment 
from this scheme ranges from a minimum of PHP5,000 to hundreds of thousands of 
pesos (US$150 to US$2,000). 
Based on the study conducted by Alvarez, this incidence of small-scale 
kidnappings was observed to be a rampant or “almost daily event” in 2014.363 He claims 
that there were at least 90 incidents of small-scale kidnappings in 2014 alone that were 
not reported to the law enforcement authorities. See Figure 13. 
 
Figure 13.  ASG Kidnapping Trends (Focus on 2013−2014).364  
With regard to the ransom amount, the Philippine government vehemently denied 
that ransom had been paid for the release of some of the kidnap victims. The military 
insisted that full-scale military operations had pressured the ASG to free some of the 
hostages. There was one video clip uploaded to the Internet, however, which showed a 
crisp stash of PHP 1,000-peso bills allegedly paid by the German couple who were 
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abducted last 2015 between the waters off Sabah, Malaysia and Palawan, Philippines. 
Nevertheless, it is general knowledge in Mindanao that most kidnap victims paid a 
certain amount for their freedom. In most cases, the Philippine government is not privy to 
the ransom payment between the abductors and relatives of the kidnap victims. Caren 
Gwen Mayola claims that in 2010, the ASG earned around US$704,000 in ransom 
payments.365  
As already noted, there are instances when relatives of kidnap victims opted to 
negotiate directly with the abductors utilizing reliable contacts or middlemen who could 
establish reliable communication lines between the families and the kidnappers. Because 
of the limited information about the ransom payment, the only data that can be obtained 
is from 2010 to 2014. This data is only an estimated ransom amount paid to the ASG 
during the said period. See Figure 14. 
 
Figure 14.  ASG Estimated Ransom Amount (Period Covered 2010–2014).366  
Table 1 shows the number of kidnap victims, to include their nationalities, who 
are still in captivity of several threat groups in Mindanao. At present, the ASG is still 
holding 31 kidnap victims. Some of these victims had been in captivity since 2010 and 
2011. 
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Table 1.   Number of Kidnap Victims by Threat Groups (Period 
Covered: 2010−2011).367 
Nationality 
Number of Kidnap Victims held captive by Threat Group 
(Period Covered: 2010−2015) 
Total 






Japanese 1     1 
Chinese  2     2 
Dutch  1     1 
Arab     1 1 
Filipino 11 1 5 5 33 55 
Canadian  2     2 
Indonesian 10     10 
Malaysian 4     4 
TOTAL 31 1 5 5 34 77 
  
B. MOTIVATIONS, RANSOM SCHEME, AND MODUS OPERANDI 
In her book, 10 Days, 10 Years: From Bin Laden to Facebook, Maria Ressa 
argues that the core motivation of the ASG is relatively hard to comprehend as compared 
with the motivation of Al Qaeda, which is simple and universal in nature.368 She claims 
that the terrorism problem in the Philippines is not ideological because “the root causes of 
the problems” stem from the unaddressed grievances of the Muslim population such as 
rampant corruption and a bad political system in which only the elite have control and 
influence over resources and little is being shared with the people.369  
Forest claims that terrorist organizations resort to kidnap for ransom “to achieve 
two kinds of goals: political or financial.”370 He also writes that terrorist groups are 
motivated to get involved in kidnappings because of vengeance, protection of their 
organizational secrets, or to create an environment of fear to coerce and control the local 
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populace.371 Forest asserts that some terrorist groups’ motivation is also to seek publicity 
or attention.372 As Phil Williams observed about the phenomenon of kidnapping 
activities in Iraq, most terrorist groups use kidnappings as a way of getting much 
attention because it provides a sense of statement and importance for the organization.373 
Cindy Combs’ argument about hostage taking and kidnapping is similar to Williams’ 
claim.374 She argues that because audience and public attention are crucial to any terrorist 
attacks, this tactic has been proven effective.375 Thus, it is appealing to the terrorists 
because they can control both the length of the incident and media coverage.376  
Based on recent information obtained from various field reports, there are three 
main reasons why the ASG resorts to kidnapping. First is economics; the lack of access to 
personal advancement prompts the locals to engage in kidnapping or to join the ASG in 
this criminal activity.377 Second is the socio-cultural reason; the funds that the ASG 
obtains through its kidnapping activities also help the communities and in some way 
alleviate poverty in those areas by providing financial assistance to the poor families.378 
Thus, the people would continue to support the ASG, and this group may win the hearts 
and minds of the populace within its area of operation and influence. Finally, although 
ransom money is being divided among its members for personal sustenance, it is also 
crucial for the group’s operational capabilities.379 Funds obtained from these criminal 
activities go to the procurement of firearms, ammunition, explosives, speed boats, 
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vehicles, and other operational requirements either for the next kidnapping activities or 
bombing attacks.380 
C. FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTE TO KIDNAPPINGS 
The security situation in Mindanao, particularly in Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi, 
has been persistently cited as the usual destination or hiding place for kidnap victims; 
reportedly, the security situation in those areas is extremely dangerous; travelling to the 
southern part of the Philippines is discouraged or must be done with extreme caution.381 
In an April 21, 2016 travel warning, the U.S. Department of State says that “U.S. citizens 
to avoid all non-essential travel to the Sulu Archipelago and through the southern Sulu 
Sea, and to exercise extreme caution when traveling to the island of Mindanao, due to 
continued terrorist threats, insurgent activities and kidnappings.”382 Because of this 
adverse presentation of Mindanao and unexplained occurrences of bombings and 
abductions, there are frequent unfavorable travel advisories from foreign countries not to 
visit Mindanao every time there is a terrorist attack or kidnapping incident.383 The 
situation is rather more complicated than media portrayals suggest, including several 
salient contributing factors. 
First, the Philippine government has failed to implement strictly the “no 
negotiation with terrorists” and no-ransom policies. Some local politicians are requested 
by the families of the kidnap victims to facilitate the negotiations and the eventual 
payment of ransom.384 Caren Gwen Mayola claims that local politicians are the most 
preferred hostage negotiators because of their connections with the ASG.385 One good 
example of this situation was when a local politician was utilized as hostage negotiator on 
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behalf of Warren Rodwell, an Australian citizen who was abducted in his residence at the 
municipality of Ipil, Zamboanga Sibugay Province in 2012.386 Such politicians can 
effectively facilitate the negotiation because they know exactly who can be employed as 
negotiators who can effectively communicate with the ASG.387  
Kinship plays an important role in this kind of situation because it is an inherent 
custom and tradition among Muslims in the Philippines.388 Although it is a clear 
violation of state policy about negotiation and ransom payment, some local politicians get 
involved in the negotiation, whose sole objective is the safety and release of the kidnap 
victims.389 But it is a general perception in Mindanao that some unscrupulous politicians 
get a cut from ransom payment. Although it has been a problem, especially in Basilan 
and Sulu provinces, it is hard to validate or find credible witnesses to press charges 
against those unscrupulous government officials.390 
Second, the PNP Anti-Kidnapping Group (AKG), particularly its sub-units in 
Mindanao, seems unable to accomplish its mandate to curb or dismantle lawless elements 
who are involved in relentless kidnapping activities in the area.391 In most cases, it, too, 
engages in the negotiation for the release of kidnap victims.392 This kind of 
ineffectiveness and unclear function of the PNP-AKG further undermines the efforts and 
capability of the government to preempt kidnap for ransom activities. The PNP-AKG is a 
well-organized unit of the police. Although it is not well-equipped in terms of state of the 
art technology, it has extensive experience and is properly trained in hostage situations. 
Confronting a hybrid organization, however, like in the case of the ASG, is a different 
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matter as compared to some small-time kidnapping syndicates in other parts of the 
country. Confronting a terrorist organization that employ criminal methods and 
collaborating with other lawless elements have been a daunting task for the PNP-
AKG.393 The ASG has emplaced a network of support agents and has learned a lot in 
KFR activities in collaboration with other lawless elements.394 
Finally, the Philippines’ extensive coastlines and porous border, as well as the 
inadequate maritime patrol and law enforcement capabilities, make the country more 
vulnerable to cross-border kidnapping. This kind of geographical situation is the primary 
reason why the ASG brazenly abducts someone within the territory of Sabah, Malaysia 
and within the territorial waters of Indonesia. The coastlines of Zamboanga peninsula 
alone seem to be an enormous job for maritime units of the police, Philippine Coast 
Guard, and Philippine Navy. Most kidnapping incidents led to the recovery of burned 
vehicles near the coastline in which the abductors transferred the kidnap victims into a 
motorized boat then sped away, going to Basilan or Sulu.395 
D. CONCLUSION 
The ASG’s evolution into a hybrid organization and combined use of terrorism 
and crime as a tool made it a more challenging threat for the government, particularly the 
relentless KFR activities in Mindanao. These illicit activities have greatly affected the 
economy and tourism industry of the southern Philippines as well as the international 
reputation and image of the country. The ASG attempted to politicize its cause by 
justifying kidnapping as part of its ideological and political struggle “to establish an 
independent Islamic state”396 in Mindanao. Actual motivation remains fund generation 
and the personal gain of its members. Funds derived from ransom payments are used for 
personal sustenance and to procure logistics, firearms, watercrafts and other war materiel. 
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The ASG remains the most serious threat and is continuously the primary concern 
with regard to peace and security of the country as a whole. The fusion of terrorism and 
crime enable the ASG to survive and remain a formidable foe, and this group would 
continue to evolve and adapt to the counterterrorism measures and strategy. Joint and 
integrated efforts of all stakeholders are crucial in this aspect and present efforts must be 
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V. THE PHILIPPINE GOVERNMENT’S APPROACH TO 
COUNTERTERRORISM  
Daljit Singh claims that some Southeast Asian countries, particularly the 
Philippines, have a long history of political violence in which insurgent groups employ 
terrorism as a tactic to achieve their objectives.397 He points out that because of 
continuous violence and threats of terrorism, Southeast Asian countries’ economies, 
foreign investment, and international reputations are heavily affected.398 Rommel 
Banlaoi asserts that, based on the 2013 Country Reports on Terrorism published by the 
U.S. Department of State, terrorism remains the most pressing security concern of the 
Philippines. Specifically, the country remains vulnerable to threats and other acts of 
terrorism emanating from non-state actors who are “involved in insurgency, banditry, and 
other violent activities.”399 The Philippines’ war against terrorism has been waged for 
almost five decades. This internal conflict has drained the country’s resources, and it has 
burdened the country’s economy and law and order.  
This chapter discusses the evolution and salient points of the Philippine 
counterterrorism strategy and examines the four critical approaches—inter-agency 
cooperation, legislation, intelligence collaboration, and military operations. Although it 
seems that the current CT strategy and approaches are doing well against the ASG, they 
have innate weaknesses and need further restudy to be more responsive in recognizing 
the ASG as a hybrid organization. This chapter contends that to implement effectively the 
national strategy for counterterrorism as embodied in the National Security Policy (NSP) 
of 2011−2016, the Philippine government must rectify its errors and inherent weaknesses 
on these four approaches to counterterrorism.  
The chapter is organized in six parts: the first part highlights the Philippine 
counterterrorism strategy and policy. The second part examines the inter-agency 
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coordination and integration and how it functions and supports the fight against terrorism. 
The third part discusses the legislative measures focusing on the anti-terrorism law that 
was enacted to combat terrorism. The fourth part outlines the intelligence approach and 
measures and how other government agencies contribute to strengthen gathering and 
sharing of information. The fifth part explains the military approach in which the Armed 
Forces of the Philippines lead the role. The sixth and seventh parts outline some of the 
significant problems or gaps identified in relation with the CT strategy and approach. 
Lastly, the chapter concludes and analyzes how the Philippine counterterrorism strategy 
can assist in understanding the ASG as a hybrid organization.  
A. NATIONAL COUNTERTERRORISM STRATEGY AND POLICY 
As stated in the Philippine National Anti-Terrorism Strategy, undoubtedly 
terrorism is a multi-faceted and complex challenge that needs a comprehensive strategy, 
which can address all aspects of the underlying causes of the problems.400 The goal of 
such a strategy is to “create a seamless web of activities” aimed at mitigating the impact 
of contemporary terrorism while ensuring that the rule of law prevails.401 Furthermore, 
Allan Behm and Michael Palmer argue that an effective strategy should be proactive, 
rather than reactive.402 According to Manalo, however, the Philippine approach to 
counterterrorism “remains reactive, rather than decisive and strategic,” and it has failed to 
provide a long term solution to the problems.403  
The Philippine government’s response to terrorism has been implemented in 
various approaches and forms. Notable is the Republic Act 9372 or the Human Security 
Act (HSA) of 2007; this law was enacted by the Philippine Congress to guide all 
government efforts in the fight against terrorism. Chester Cabalza mentions that this law 
provides a legal framework for counterterrorism strategy and security policies to ensure 
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that all actions are done within the bounds of the law.404 As stated in Section 2, 
Paragraph 1 of the HSA of 2007, “it is the policy of the state to protect life, liberty, and 
property from acts of terrorism, to condemn terrorism as inimical and dangerous to the 
national security of the country and to the welfare of the people, and to make terrorism a 
crime against the Filipino people, against humanity, and against the law of nations.”405  
Aguirre writes that as a member of the United Nations, the Philippines actively 
adhere to international conventions as well as to some bilateral and multi-lateral treaties 
that would “prevent, suppress and counter all forms of terrorism.”406 With this 
commitment, he claims that the Philippines became an “active proponent and signatory to 
the ASEAN and APEC Declarations” to combat terrorism and actively cooperate and 
collaborate with its regional neighbors and other allies.407 The Philippines ratified and 
signed the UN Security Council Resolution Numbers 1373, 1267, and 1390 on terrorism. 
Manalo asserts that to enhance cooperation and to effectively combat terrorism, the 
Philippine government must engage its regional partners and other allies, particularly the 
ASEAN, and the United States.408  
In 2001, the Philippine government declared its national policy on 
counterterrorism through the “Fourteen Pillars of Policy and Action against Terrorism.” 
This policy was articulated in the Presidential Memorandum Order 37 (2001), and the 
key principles are the following:  
1. Supervision and implementation of policies and actions of the government 
against terrorism 
2. Intelligence coordination 
3. Internal focus against terrorism 
4. Accountability of public and private corporations and personalities 
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5. Synchronizing internal efforts with global outlook 
6. Legal measures 
7. Promotion of Christian and Muslim solidarity 
8. Vigilance against the movement of terrorists and their supporters, 
equipment, weapons and funds 
9. Contingency plans 
10. Comprehensive security plans for critical infrastructure 
11. Support of overseas Filipino workers 
12. Modernization of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Philippine 
National Police 
13. Media support 
14. Political, social and economic measures409 
In June 2009, the Anti-Terrorism Council (ATC) approved the National Anti-
Terrorism Strategy (NATS). The goal of this strategy is to effectively counter terrorism 
and to achieve a “physically and psychologically secure environment conducive for peace 
and socio-economic development.”410 It has the following objectives: 
1. To protect life, liberty and property from acts of terrorism 
2. To condemn terrorism as inimical and dangerous to the national security 
of the country and to the welfare of the Filipino people 
3. To make terrorism a crime against the Filipino people, against humanity 
and against the law of nations411  
Several concepts guide the implementation of the strategy. First, it must be a 
comprehensive approach that considers the terrorist threat as hindrance to economic 
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stability peace and security.412 As stated in the National Security Policy (NSP) of 2011–
2016, counterterrorism requires a comprehensive approach that takes into consideration 
the political, economic, diplomatic, military, and legal aspects to fully understand and 
properly address the root causes of the problems.413 Second, it is collaborative in the 
sense that it involves the entire government machinery and is in partnership with the 
private sector and local communities in developing and delivering an adaptable anti-
terrorism strategy.414 Public awareness of the threat, understanding of the government 
measures, and active support and cooperation with law enforcers are crucial to the 
success of the strategy.415 Through the national anti-terrorism strategy, the Philippine 
government may be able to achieve a secure and peaceful environment conducive to 
progress and sustainable development.416 
Moreover, the NSP of 2011–2016, “Securing the Gains of Democracy,” which 
was promulgated by President Benigno Aquino, complements the HSA of 2007. As 
stated in the National Crisis Management Core Manual, the NSP “is a statement of 
principles that guide national decision-making and determine courses of action to be 
taken to attain the state or condition wherein the national interest, the well-being of the 
people and institutions, and the sovereignty and territorial integrity are protected and 
enhanced.”417 In relation to combating terrorism, the NSP “emphasizes a multi-level and 
multi-disciplinary approach and the enlisting of support from domestic and international 
allies.”418  
Generally, the NSP outlines a three-tiered defense system that comprises the 
“enhancement of the intelligence capabilities, protection and security of vulnerable 
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targets, and enhancement of readiness and preparedness in the event of a successful 
terrorist attack.”419 According to this document, to achieve all of these, the Philippine 
government must enhance its security counter-measures, apply effective legislative and 
legal measures, and employ effective mechanisms to prevent or preempt terrorist attacks 
and prevent individuals from resorting to acts of terror.420 Ananda Devi Domingo-
Almase claims that the NSP provides a strategic guidance “to strengthen public 
institutions, protect the environment, combat terrorism, engage in regional cooperation, 
and modernize the armed forces.”421 
B. INTER-AGENCY COORDINATION AND INTEGRATION 
Coordination is critically important in the implementation of the national strategy 
and policy to combat terrorism. It pertains to the “effective and efficient integration of all 
efforts and responses of the government” to address terrorism and root causes of the 
problems.422 According to Lynn Davis, Gregory F. Treverton, Daniel Byman, Sara A. 
Daly, and William Rosenau, “coordination is a word more used than understood in 
government.”423 They claim that it is prone to mistakes and other organizational concerns 
if individual departments will operate separately and decide for themselves without 
proper coordination.424 To attain and ensure the unity of efforts requires inter-agency 
coordination among different departments and agencies of the government. To integrate 
all efforts against terrorism, it is crucial that various government agencies and 
departments work closely and establish links with each other. 
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Davis et al. claim that the policy makers in the United States realized that “the 
instruments of counterterrorism,” such as “hostage negotiations, intelligence cooperation, 
and international legal regimes” are connected; thus, it requires close coordination 
between the Departments of State, Justice, and Defense, and the CIA.425 
Inter-agency coordination can effectively address the root causes of the problem. 
With regard to terrorism, it is essential to address the underlying reasons that drive 
certain individuals to become a terrorist or commit acts of violence and understand the 
socio-cultural aspect of the environment in which they thrive and operate.426 Zachary 
Abuza argues that the majority of Southeast Asian countries have “weak political 
institutions, decentralized politics, poor resources,” and are marred by rampant 
corruption. Weak institutions and lack of government control make them more attractive 
to terrorist groups.427 He claims that corruption has been prominent in weak states; as 
such, rivalries between state security forces over jurisdiction and illegal activities have 
been a common problem. To clearly understand the terrorism problem, there must be an 
in-depth analysis of the situation and consideration of various underlying factors, which 
in this case, requires an effective and active inter-agency cooperation and coordination. 
Integration of efforts allows maximum synchronization of all activities and prevents 
jeopardizing the strategic approach of the government. Additionally, when inter-agency 
mechanisms have been set up, they provide effective monitoring, feedback, and 
assessment of all concerned agencies, which ensures that all efforts are appropriate, 
suitable, and relevant.   
Command and coordination structures, which are coherent and responsive, have 
proven critical in any counterterrorism approach. Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison-
Taw emphasize one of the elements that is important in counterterrorism: “an effective 
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overall command and coordination.”428 They claim that prior to any attack or 
disturbance, the government should have established a functioning command and 
coordination structure. This is important to prevent confusion, competition among 
agencies, duplication of efforts, and inefficient gathering and dissemination of 
information.429 The Philippines has its share of bad experiences with ineffective inter-
agency coordination. Two examples are the incompetence in handling the Sipadan 
kidnapping on April 23, 2000 and the Dos Palmas Resort kidnapping incident on May 28, 
2001. 
To defeat the ASG and other lawless elements in Mindanao requires active 
participation and cooperation of all government agencies and institutions. Terrorism 
posed by the ASG, particularly its relentless KFR activities, is not only a concern of the 
state security forces, but it is the problem of the nation as a whole. Thus, the government 
must direct all agencies to participate and work together to defeat the ASG and other 
lawless elements in Mindanao. A command and coordination structure that is properly 
organized and coherent will lead to an effective integration and sharing of intelligence 
among different agencies.430 This structure allows utmost synchronization of efforts in 
which all actions and programs of concerned agencies are in line with the national 
strategy on counterterrorism.  
C. LEGISLATIVE MEASURES 
The Philippine government has adopted several legislative and legal measures to 
address the threat of terrorism and crime perpetrated by various terrorist groups. After the 
9/11 attacks, the Philippine government entered into several international agreements. 
The intent was to collectively contribute to the government’s anti-terrorism program and 
strengthen global cooperation to fight international terrorism. As a member of the UN, 
the Philippine government demonstrates its sincere commitment “to prevent, suppress, 
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and counter all forms of terrorist acts in accordance with the UN Charter and UN 
Resolutions or declarations,” particularly with UN Security Council Resolutions 1267, 
1373, and 1390, UN Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy, and other relevant international 
laws.431 These international commitments and agreements also include law enforcement-
focused arrangements that support the anti-terrorism program, including mutual legal 
assistance treaties and other international relationships, such as the Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and other multi-
lateral engagements.432 
The Philippine government, through the legislative branch, has responded 
promptly to the security arrangements with the international or world organizations, such 
as the United Nations Organization, APEC, ARF, and the U.S. Global War on Terror, in 
the passage of anti-terrorism laws—specifically, the Human Security Act of 2007. Under 
this law, anti-terrorism efforts encompass some defensive measures to preempt and 
prevent terrorist attacks and strengthen the basic foundation to effectively counter 
terrorism and any form of violent activities.433 This law, however, does not prevent the 
Philippine government from employing some offensive measures, which should be taken 
to preempt, prevent, deter and actively respond to any acts of terrorism.434 For instance, 
one of the tenets of the AFP to combat terrorism is “to destroy the terrorist organization 
through the employment of every tool available to dismantle their capacity to commit 
acts of terror.”435 Pauline Eadie writes that the Philippine HSA of 2007 was a response to 
the Global War on Terror of the United States after the 9/11 attacks.436 Bobby Tuazon 
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claims that “the beginnings of the HSA can be traced to 9/11 and the U.S. Patriot Act,”437 
but Juan Ponce Enrile, a Philippine senator and one of the co-sponsors of this law, 
vehemently denied that the Philippine HSA was copied from the U.S. Patriot Act.438 
The Philippine anti-terrorism law, the Human Security Act of 2007, states that 
anyone “sowing and creating a condition of widespread extraordinary fear and panic 
among the populace, in order to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand 
shall be guilty of the crime of terrorism.”439 It outlines how terrorism is punishable under 
the Philippine law, specifying that those convicted “shall suffer the penalty of forty (40) 
years of imprisonment, without the benefit of parole as provided for under Act No. 4103, 
otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.”440 
Alexander Aguirre points out that the Philippine government enacted the Human 
Security Act of 2007, which defines terrorism as a crime and provides penalties for such 
acts.441 He claims that in order to be used for law enforcement operations this definition 
was formulated without appropriate legislative policy on terrorism. This terrorism law 
further states that the State recognizes that counterterrorism requires a comprehensive 
approach that includes political, diplomatic, economic, military, legislative and other 
factors.442 According to Aguirre, however, this approach should take into consideration 
what the root causes of the problems are without recognizing them as a justification to 
conduct terrorist acts and other forms of violence.443 It should be noted, however, that the 
law in itself is not a strategy to combat terrorism.444 
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To suppress terrorism financing, the Philippine government ratified some laws 
and executive orders to cut the flow of funds and freeze the assets of the local and foreign 
terrorist groups. Rommel Banlaoi asserts that in 2001, the Philippine congress approved 
the Anti-Money Laundering Act as one of the countermeasures for this purpose.445 To 
further bolster the legislative approach against terrorist financing, President Benigno 
Aquino approved the Republic Act Number 10168, otherwise known as the “Terrorism 
Financing Prevention and Suppression Act of 2012.”446 This law is the response of the 
Philippine government to its commitment to the “International Conventions for the 
Suppression of the Financing [of] Terrorism and other binding terrorism-related 
resolutions of the UN Security Council.”447 This law requires banks and financial 
institutions to report dubious transactions involving funds that have possible links to 
terrorists, and to freeze properties, funds, and related accounts of suspected terrorist 
groups and individuals who are associated with Al Qaeda.448 
The enactment of HSA of 2007 and other related laws to combat terrorism in the 
Philippines has resulted in the apprehension of several terrorist personalities, particularly 
members of the ASG. Although there are some criticisms about the Philippine anti-
terrorism law, it serves as deterrence for an individual to commit acts of terror or any 
forms of violence.   
Cabalza argues that the Philippine anti-terrorism law is too broad and only 
reinstates the crimes listed in the Revised Penal Code of 1932 or Republic Act No. 3815, 
which is an 84-year-old law now.449 He claims that the crimes that are listed in the HSA 
of 2007 are deemed punishable under the Revised Penal Code in which there must be 
clear parameters in converting common crimes into terrorism. The HSA of 2007 is the 
only Philippine law that strictly penalizes torture and imposes stiff penalties and fines on 
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law enforcers.450 Although it is a benchmark for the Philippine law to prosecute 
terrorists, it needs some legal amendments to synchronize its provisions and make some 
logical connections between its sub-sections. This law is a combination of 62 sections 
and 22 provisions without “discernable structure, no headings or sub-headings, and no 
groupings of sections.”451 Cabalza asserts that this law “authorizes preventive detention, 
expands the power of warrantless arrest, and allows for unchecked invasion of privacy, 
liberty and other basic rights.”452  
D. INTELLIGENCE COOPERATION AND COLLABORATION 
To counter terrorism effectively, it is crucial to strengthen and enhance the 
intelligence capabilities of all concerned agencies and various state security forces, but on 
the other hand, it is also imperative that an effective and efficient mechanism has been set 
up for collaboration among domestic and foreign intelligence agencies. Thomas Bruneau 
and Florina Cristiana Matei argue that terrorist attacks in the United States, the United 
Kingdom, and Spain led all these states to prioritize their intelligence capabilities and 
effectiveness.453 They point out that these nations not only focus on reforming some 
“norms of intelligence”—budgets, resources, doctrines, and regulations—but they also 
enhance “interagency cooperation and coordination.”454  
Singh argues that each state must fight its terrorism concern within its national 
jurisdiction employing its full capacity and resources to defeat and destroy any terrorist 
organization.455 He asserts that this national effort must be reinforced with sound and 
effective intelligence cooperation with other countries because of the transnational nature 
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of the threat.456 Bilateral cooperation has been proven effective in terms of strengthening 
intelligence cooperation and collaboration between states. In the case of Southeast Asia 
countries, regional organizations—ASEAN and ARF—declared strong “collective 
positions” against terrorism, and these organizations facilitated a wide range of capacity 
building measures in collaboration with “advanced outside countries.”457 
According to Manalo, collaboration and cooperation of all intelligence units are 
crucial to successfully combat the threat of terrorism.458 He points out that all 
intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), the Philippine National 
Police (PNP), the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), and the National Intelligence 
Coordinating Agency (NICA) should enhance their linkages and sharing of 
information.459 The availability of timely and accurate intelligence tends to identify, 
monitor, and locate high-value individuals, and most importantly, it allows security 
forces to predict the terrorists’ plans and intentions. Knowing this information from the 
outset, the government can implement appropriate preemptive measures to mitigate or 
avoid loss of life or damage to property.  
Additionally, collaboration and relations among regional partners and other allies 
are crucial in counterterrorism strategy. Intelligence sharing is one of the critical 
advantages of this endeavor because cooperation and collaboration unite all efforts of all 
countries to combat international terrorism. It establishes good relationships to work 
closely with domestic and foreign counterparts “to predict, prevent, deter, and suppress 
acts of terrorism.”460 To strengthen border controls and sharing of intelligence, it is 
important that concerned countries have strong and regular bilateral and multi-lateral 
engagements.461 These kinds of activities enhance cooperation and sharing of critical 
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information through regular intelligence exchange and conference between countries.462 
Tan notes that after the 9/11 attacks, ASEAN countries issued a joint declaration and 
agreed to cooperation to combat domestic and international terrorism.463 He points out 
that these nations agreed to strengthen national mechanisms and sharing of intelligence, 
and to support all actions and initiatives of the UN. One good example of this is the 
regular intelligence exchange between the U.S. Pacific Command and Southeast Asian 
countries. Also, notable in this endeavor are the Global Counter-terrorism Forum (GCTF) 
and the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting Experts Working Group on Counter-
terrorism. 
Moreover, sharing of information among agencies and intelligence units is also 
one of the pressing concerns of the Philippines. Although there are some mechanisms that 
are emplaced to solve this matter, some intelligence units are still reluctant to share their 
information. Netanyahu claims that because of professional rivalry and jealousy among 
intelligence agencies and in order to protect the source, critical intelligence reports are 
not being shared among and between regional partners and even among various agencies 
within the same country.464 At the national and regional level, different intelligence 
agencies and units meet regularly through their respective area intelligence coordinating 
committees. Although this arrangement of intelligence coordination and integration has 
been helpful and resolved certain issues, some intelligence agencies seem to be hesitating 
to share information. This problem is aggravated by inter-agency rivalries, policies, laws, 
and sometimes because of turf protection.465 Nathan White claims that law enforcement 
agencies and various intelligence units usually do not trust each other because of the 
independent nature of some police officials who are reluctant to share information within 
or outside of their organization.466  
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According to Bruce Hoffman and Jennifer Morrison-Taw, unified and coordinated 
structure against terrorism is vital to share and disseminate valuable intelligence among 
various security forces.467 Obvious rivalry among security forces has been one of the 
reasons why the Philippine government efforts against terrorism are not gaining much 
momentum. Although several significant accomplishments have been achieved and led to 
the capture or neutralization of high-value targets, they have not been enough to totally 
defeat the enemy and the attacks persist. Iztok Prezelj claims that in the United States, the 
CIA and FBI also experienced some concerns on intelligence sharing because of their 
“institutional culture,” “ways of thinking,” and interests.468 He points out that these 
differences also resulted in “competition for cases and budgets.”469  
The threat posed by the ASG as a hybrid organization requires not just efficient 
and effective means of recruiting reliable informants and collecting quality information, 
but importantly, this information is being shared among other intelligence agencies and 
units. Arguably, sharing of intelligence has been one of the weaknesses and perennial 
problems of the Philippines in its fight to destroy the ASG. Daniel Byman claims that 
“Israel’s intelligence services are fabled around the world for their efficiency, skill, and 
seeming omniscience.”470 He points out that the successes of Israel in counterterrorism 
depend on its efficient and constant sharing of information at all levels and closely 
integrating intelligence in all military operations.471 Relentless KFR activities can be 
preempted or prevented if all intelligence agencies have quality informants who have 
good access and placement on the ASG and other criminal organizations. David Bonner 
claims that intelligence operatives and informants are critical factors in a successful 
counterterrorism approach, and their cover must be protected at all times.472 Hoffman 
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and Morrison-Taw argue that proper use of information is critically important to any 
counterterrorism campaign.473 They point out that the most important tasks in this aspect 
are the coordination and dissemination of intelligence, which can only be done through a 
centralized intelligence organization that can effectively relay information to the tactical 
units. 
E. FOCUSED MILITARY OPERATIONS 
According to Condoleezza Rice, “true victory will not come merely when the 
terrorists are defeated by force, but when the ideology of death and hatred is overcome by 
the appeal of life and hope, and when lies are replaced by truth.”474 As Benjamin 
Netanyahu argues, “while military measures should not be the first option, they should 
never be excluded from the roster of possibilities.”475 On the other hand, terrorist 
organizations, whether state or non-state actors, must feel that the likelihood of extreme 
military retaliation is expected if they would resort to violence.476 Along that line, Israel 
responded with massive military operations and a series of targeted killings of suspected 
terrorists. Clive Jones claims that this military approach led to the arrest or killing of 
senior leaders and destroyed the military infrastructure of Hamas.477 Despite the brutality 
of this method, it received “wide public support in Israel.”478 Decapitation of the terrorist 
organization by targeted killings may not end terrorism or stop violence, but it served as 
deterrence and saved hundreds of innocent lives.479 This war-fighting strategy adopted by 
Israel disrupted the enemy’s plan and damaged their capabilities to conduct further 
attacks. 
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When former President Gloria Arroyo declared her “Fourteen Pillars of Policy 
and Action” to combat terrorism, the Philippine government enacted General Order 
Number 2 “directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the Philippine 
National Police (PNP) to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism and lawless violence in 
Mindanao.”480 The AFP is specifically mandated to strengthen and develop its 
counterterrorism capabilities and to conduct sustained and focused military operations 
against the ASG and other terrorist groups. On the other hand, the PNP is directed to 
strengthen its security measures and police visibility to protect vital installations. They 
are also mandated to develop and strengthen their police counterterrorism capabilities, 
particularly in urban fighting and hostage situations. 
In “Keeping on the Right Track: An Assessment on the Effectiveness of AFP 
Responses to ASG Threat,” Ferdinand B. Napuli argues that the only solution to defeat 
the ASG is to neutralize its key leaders and isolate the group from its mass base 
support.481 He points out, however, that the ASG has been adored by the communities 
within its area of influence because this group has been providing funds out of the 
ransom money from its KFR activities. This kind of support helps to improve the 
standard of living of the marginalized tribes, especially in Basilan, Sulu, and Tawi-Tawi 
provinces, that the government has failed to do. Thus, focused military operation will not 
totally defeat the ASG because it has the critical support of the people that would impede 
the conduct of intense military operations.482 The AFP may engage various agencies and 
civil society organizations and encourage their active participation in delivering the 
public goods to the marginalized communities in Mindanao. These organizations can 
easily adapt to the communities’ dialect and culture, and they can freely ask the people 
about their problems. Thus, the military may treat these organizations as important 
partners to achieve peace. 
                                                 
480 Banlaoi, Counter Terrorism Measures in Southeast Asia, 78. 
481 Napuli, “Keeping on the Right Track: An Assessment on the Effectiveness of AFP Responses to 
ASG Threat,” 74. 
482 Ibid. 
 98 
Nevertheless, the main thrust of the Philippine government against the ASG is 
through focused military operations. The end state of the AFP’s focused military 
operations is to downgrade internal armed threats so that “they can no longer threaten the 
stability of the state and civil authorities can ensure the safety and well-being of the 
Filipino people.”483 Even if the AFP destroys completely the ASG, however, terrorism 
and crime will persist as the main security challenges for the Philippines if the political 
and socio-economic condition in Mindanao remains the same. To complement this 
approach, the military has been instituting some measures to undermine ASG’s popular 
support from the communities under its influence.484 Santiago Ballina claims that with 
the help of the United States, the Philippines adopted a whole-nation approach through 
various socio-economic measures to reduce poverty and provide essential public goods 
for the poor communities where the ASG thrives.485 He claims, however, that this 
strategy still heavily focuses on military operations and does not adequately address the 
broader and root problems in Mindanao such as marginalization and weak institutions. 
The military approach will not completely eradicate the threat, but other approaches will 
be futile without taking into consideration the role of the military. On the other hand, the 
government should take strong measures and feasible strategies to address political, 
social, and economic issues.  
F. PROBLEMS AND GAPS IDENTIFIED 
 The current Philippine CT strategy and approach has failed to recognize 
the criminal aspect of the ASG.  
Nothing has changed with regard to the approach of the Philippines against the 
threat posed by the ASG. The Philippine government remains reactive, rather than 
proactive, in terms of eradicating terrorism and organized crime activities by this group 
and other lawless elements in Mindanao. Several security experts and law enforcement 
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officials claim that the ASG has become a bunch of criminals, but there is no compelling 
countermeasures have been introduced to fight this so-called nexus of terrorism and 
crime. The approach remains the same of employing a war model to counterterrorism 
without completely understanding the underlying root causes of the problems and 
knowing the precise category of the ASG as a threat group. Terrorist and criminal 
organizations are two different entities; thus, they may require different approaches to 
defeat and deter their violent and criminal activities.  
 Lack of strong political will to implement the comprehensive strategy and 
approach to counter terrorism.  
To effectively eradicate the ASG and other lawless elements in Mindanao, the 
current administration may consider exerting strong political will to implement the most 
comprehensive counterterrorism strategy, a strategy that deals with both the terrorism and 
criminal nature of the ASG. Strong political will may encompass prosecuting some 
unscrupulous local politicians and government officials, particularly members of the 
military and police, who are supporting and colluding with the ASG. The current political 
leadership must push and exert strong pressure on all concerned departments, agencies, 
and LGUs to do their mandated tasks and responsibilities to completely defeat and 
eradicate the ASG’s terrorist and criminal activities. Implementation and enforcement of 
important laws and executive directives for different departments, agencies, and LGUs 
also require strong political will. No matter how good the security policies of the national 
government are, if some concerned actors are not doing their jobs the effort may 
inevitably fail. 
 The Philippines has a weak legislation and criminal justice system to 
combat the nexus of crime and terrorism.   
The anti-terrorism campaign of the Philippine government is anchored on the 
HSA of 2007 or the Philippines’ main anti-terrorism law. Arguably, this law seems 
ineffective to protect the people and the state against terrorism. The current anti-terrorism 
law needs some critical amendments to address certain issues and gaps in order to be 
more effective. As part of the legislative approach to combat terrorism, this law should be 
a potent tool of law enforcement agencies to effectively prosecute suspected terrorists and 
their associates. On the other hand, this law has a vague definition of the term terrorism, 
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and terrorism offenses are merely copied from the old version of the Revise Penal Code. 
This law treats criminal offenses under the old Revised Penal Code as terrorism, thereby 
creating “a condition of widespread fear and panic among the populace.”486 Some of the 
provisions of the law are contrary to the protection of human rights and privacy. In 
addition, it does not explicitly define the tolerable or acceptable penalties and damages. 
Notably, as of now, this law has never been used in court to prosecute suspected 
terrorists—directly or indirectly involved in terrorist activities—because some legal 
experts argue that this law is legally and basically hard to use. 
 Intelligence politicization and competition among intelligence units of 
different government agencies hampered the effectiveness of the current 
counterterrorism strategy.  
Politicization has been one of the challenges of the intelligence agencies. As 
Robert Gates claims, “the problem of politicization is as old as the intelligence 
business.”487 Mark Lowenthal argues that the problem of politicization is like “two 
spheres of government activity separated by a semipermeable membrane.”488 He explains 
that policymakers are free to offer assessments of intelligence while intelligence officers 
are not allowed to influence policymaking.489 Politicization may destroy the credibility of 
the intelligence organization in terms of providing inaccurate analysis and assessment. 
Accurate and timely intelligence are important for policymakers to help them in their 
decision-making process, and the intelligence community can provide these 
requirements. Intelligence’s main role is only to support, and it cannot cross the line to 
influence the jobs of policymakers. In some cases, policymakers offer input on or accept 
only intelligence that is advantageous to their political interests and personal gains.490 
Eduardo Estévez claims that politicization of the Argentinian military intelligence led to 
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the South Atlantic Conflict, in which the intelligence services provided inaccurate 
interpretation of the collected information.491 
Although the national and regional intelligence coordinating committees have 
been created, inherent cultural and competency differences of various intelligence units 
hamper the level of coordination and sharing of critical information. Some crucial 
changes in terms of institutional policies to improve coordination and enhance 
interoperability during law enforcement operations must be adapted from top to bottom. 
Additionally, there is no central database that collects and collates essential information 
against the enemy. In most cases, a particular intelligence or case officer keeps and 
carries their own files; thus, this practice prevents the transfer of crucial intelligence and 
knowledge within the intelligence community. Competition and rivalry in terms of 
capturing prominent personalities or high-value targets have been a common problem 
among intelligence agencies, and in some cases have led to a misunderstanding between 
state security forces. 
 Some government agencies, departments, LGUs, and non-government 
organizations have failed to do their parts to eradicate the ASG and its 
criminal activities.  
To effectively implement the whole-nation approach, all stakeholders be must be 
taken into consideration and do their part. Public and private partnership is also crucial in 
this endeavor. It may also be seen as a challenge for all stakeholders, and the solution is 
only possible if all these stakeholders act in unison. The counterterrorism strategy of the 
Philippines intends to involve various government agencies and departments, LGUs, non-
government organizations, and other concerned stakeholders to defeat terrorism and win 
the hearts and minds of the people. Inter-agency coordination has not really been 
functioning as what was written on paper. Coordination among different departments and 
agencies only works perfectly when a tragic incident or terrorist attack has occurred, 
rather than integrating their efforts to address the root causes of the problems and prevent 
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the attacks. The whole-nation approach will not work if one of the actors is not doing 
their mandated tasks. 
 Some politicians down to the local level have been suspected of coddling 
and supporting the ASG, particularly in the kidnapping operations. 
Source of funds is important to any organization, and the ASG’s main source of 
financing is KFR operations. Reportedly, some local politicians in Mindanao are not only 
coddling this group, but some of them are also financing this criminal activity. Even 
though it is common knowledge that some corrupt politicians have been conniving with 
the ASG, no one has been convicted or sanctioned for this misdemeanor.492 Additionally, 
some members of the ASG who are employed as private armed groups or militias of 
some local politicians contribute to the problem.  
G. NOTABLE PROBLEMS THAT LED TO RELENTLESS KIDNAPPINGS 
 Most of the kidnap victims are negotiating and paying the ransom for their 
safety and freedom.  
According to the Special Report on this subject conducted by the Philippine 
Army, there are cases wherein a kidnap victim’s family paid in full or through installment 
basis prior to the release of the hostage.493 The ASG provides proof of life photos or 
video clips posted on the Internet or sent directly to the families of the victims prior to 
receiving a portion of the total ransom payment.494 In some cases, the ASG uses the “pay 
now or be kidnapped later” scheme in which the target is threatened with kidnapping, 
forcing the victim to pay to avoid being abducted by the group. The ransom is less than 
that of abducted victims due to minimal operational expenses; the group refers to this 
money as a board and lodging fee. The ASG also conducts checkpoints, targeting local 
residents and temporarily holds the victim for a couple of hours until a certain amount of 
money is paid in exchange for their release.495 
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The ASG seems to favor direct negotiation with the victim’s family or relatives 
due to the prospect of higher and actual ransom payment.496 In some cases, however, the 
ASG also uses mediators or third-party negotiators, especially if the group is unable to 
directly communicate with the victim’s relatives.497 One example is the kidnapping 
incident of Randelle Talania of Titay Town, Zamboanga Sibugay Province in 2011. He 
was just a nine-year-old boy that time when armed men took him in front of the Titay 
Elementary School.498 The ASG utilized one village chieftain from Basilan to 
communicate with the families of the kidnap victim. This man, who acted as mediator, 
informed the families about the ransom demand and other requirements of the child.499  
The knowledge and expertise of the negotiator is crucial during the negotiation 
process. According to Peter Dobbs, “the nominated negotiator needs to be fluent in the 
kidnappers’ language and preferably have some knowledge of the region.”500 He claims 
that a good negotiator must immediately establish rapport with the kidnappers, ask for 
proof of life, and make sure that demands are clearly stated before making any offer for 
the release of the victim.501 In addition, some local politicians and prominent individuals 
also facilitate the negotiation for the release of some kidnap victims.502 
 Some ASG sympathizers—Muslim and Christians—act as tipster or 
spotter for the terrorist group in exchange of monetary rewards or a share 
of the ransom.  
The spotter plays an important role in kidnap for ransom activities as he or she is 
often tasked to come up with a list of possible targets who are either capable of paying 
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the ransom demand or are connected to personalities or entities that are capable of 
paying.503 While the ASG is currently constricted in some areas of Basilan and Sulu, 
some of its members are residing in urban areas and are being utilized as spotters for 
possible targets.504 When the target is chosen, casing and surveillance follow 
immediately. There are also cases where the ASG does not conduct planning and 
surveillance and simply seizes the victim when the opportunity arises, however.505 
 The military and police have failed to dismantle various lawless elements 
and private armed groups that provide operational and logistical support to 
the ASG.  
In the execution of kidnapping activities, especially outside the traditional areas of 
operation, the ASG taps local criminal groups and other lawless elements to kidnap the 
target in return for a share of the projected ransom payment.506 In some cases, criminal 
elements conduct the kidnapping themselves and then transfer the victim to the ASG. To 
get a higher ransom payment, the ASG engages in the negotiation because it has already 
established a brutal reputation of beheading its victims if demands are not met on time.507 
In this case, the lawless elements would either be paid for their expenses or wait until the 
ransom is paid.508  
The ASG also utilizes proven and tested tactics and possible routes to transfer the 
kidnap victims to Basilan or Sulu. Lawless elements and the ASG excel in both the 
planning and the execution of their kidnapping operations.509 In fact, despite naval 
blockades along the waters off Zamboanga peninsula and the Sulu Archipelago, the ASG 
has successfully evaded government forces and gotten away by utilizing only small 
motorized boats.510 The presence of several military detachments and other checkpoints 
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in various places and strategic choke points in Zamboanga peninsula appear to be 
ineffective.511  
One good example was the kidnapping of Rodney Rodwell, an Australian citizen 
who is married to a Filipina and residing near the center of the municipality of Ipil, 
Zamboanga Sibuga Province.512 The ASG executed a daring kidnapping operation by 
boldly abducting Rodwell from his residence despite the presence of various military and 
police outposts in the area. These security measures do not preempt the ASG from 
abducting someone in the middle of the city or town center.513 
The collaboration and coordination between criminal organizations and the ASG 
in conducting joint criminal activities seem to be very effective and efficient.514 The 
group takes advantage of small islets and mangrove areas for hiding and evading 
pursuing government forces prior to being transferred to the group’s temporary 
encampments.515 Notably, the geography of Basilan, Sulu and Tawi-Tawi is a key factor 
in the conduct of ASG kidnappings as the different islands provide ideal escape routes 
and safe havens.516 
H. CONCLUSION 
One of the challenges for the Philippine government with regard to terrorism is 
the ASG. The ASG has been fluctuating between terrorism and crime, and has become a 
serious security concern that poses a tremendous threat to the internal peace and security 
of the Philippines. To come up with an appropriate counterterrorism strategy or approach, 
it is imperative to grasp this nexus of crime and terrorism. Although the Philippine 
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government’s counterterrorism strategy and approach has successfully apprehended or 
neutralized several ASG personalities, the ASG remains a capable and resilient 
organization. The case of the ASG as a hybrid organization requires some changes on the 
current strategy, and intense military operations alone will not work. Since KFR is the 
main source of financing of this group, the response must be coupled with a 
comprehensive national strategy to stop KFR activities and dismantle its network and 
support system. 
The Philippine government should develop a comprehensive counterterrorism 
approach that takes into consideration the inherent vulnerabilities and mistakes in terms 
of inter-agency coordination, legislation, and intelligence sharing and collaboration 
between regional and international partners. Any countermeasures must be 
complemented on the ground by focused and intelligence-driven joint military and police 
operations. One of the measures to combat terrorism is through legislation, but pertinent 
laws should always build on good public relations and concern about fundamental rights 
of individuals. It is crucial that appropriate and strong anti-terrorism laws should be 
enacted to effectively prosecute ASG members and their affiliates, and they must be 
meaningful and coherent laws that recognize the crucial support of the public. 
Additionally, intelligence is an important factor for any counterterrorism strategy; thus, 
collaboration of all intelligence agencies is critically important. Finally, any military and 
police counterterrorism operation should be intelligence driven, and it should be followed 
by political, social, and economic measures through the engagement of all concerned 





The nexus of crime and terrorism—as exemplified by the ASG—has been one of 
the challenges in Mindanao. Most terrorist organizations have learned to adapt to the 
current security environment in order to survive and be more operationally capable in 
terms of conducting attacks and securing a steady flow of funds. Although the ASG had 
been involved in other criminal activities, this paper examines the ASG’s kidnapping 
operations because it is one of the major concerns and made the current CT strategy seem 
ineffective or possibly inadequate in eradicating terrorism and crime in the southern part 
of Mindanao. Additionally, the ASG’s Kidnap-for-Ransom (KFR) operations, as a case 
study, provide a good window into how the fusion of terrorism and crime can be clearly 
understood and analyzed. This can help policymakers and state security forces to come 
up with a comprehensive set of countermeasures. Knowing and understanding precisely 
the ASG’s place in the Crime-Terror Continuum model will help policymakers to come 
up with comprehensive policies and approaches against these security concerns. 
Additionally, understanding the ASG as a hybrid organization will help lawmakers to 
enact appropriate laws that will effectively prosecute terrorists who employ criminal 
methods as a tool. The ASG’s strength or influence might be reduced, but if the root 
causes of the problems are not properly addressed, then the terrorist organization will 
continue to survive and will persist as a perpetual threat. 
The following is the summary of findings generated by this research: 
1. The ASG has evolved into a hybrid organization.  
The ASG is an excellent example of the nexus of crime and terrorism. Despite its 
rampant involvement in kidnapping activities and other criminal activities, the ASG 
remains an Islamic terrorist organization. This group explicitly employs criminal methods 
to further its terrorist activities. According to Banlaoi, “Countering the threat posed by 
the ASG is a formidable challenge for law enforcement and other government 
agencies.”517 Because of its superb skills at linking and maintaining strong alliances with 
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numerous armed groups in Mindanao that are engaged in various terroristic and criminal 
activities, the ASG has become a more formidable and resilient organization.518  
2. The Philippine CT strategy remains focused on a military model approach 
to confront the ASG.  
The threat posed by the ASG is not just a military and police problem. The 
problem of terrorism and crime posed by the ASG and other lawless elements in 
Mindanao requires a whole-government approach. This approach pertains to collective 
efforts and shared responsibilities of different government agencies, departments, NGOs, 
and other private sectors and stakeholders.  
Although the Philippines’ current CT strategy and approach have resulted in some 
notable accomplishments, particularly the arrest and neutralization of notorious key 
personalities of the ASG, the threat of terrorism and other violent activities, especially the 
rampant kidnapping activities in Mindanao, persists. This concern greatly affects the 
peace and security situation of the country. One of the objectives of inter-agency 
cooperation and collaboration is fusion and synchronization of efforts to destroy the ASG 
and its criminal activities. An effective oversight council, along with appropriate 
mechanisms, is crucial to engage and unite the efforts of other actors in national 
government agencies and civil society.  
3. The current anti-terrorism law of the Philippines (Human Security Act of 
2007) proved to be incoherent and ineffective as a legislative measure to 
deter or prevent terrorism. 
The Philippine anti-terrorism law is too broad, and it just reinstates the crimes 
listed in the Revised Penal Code of 1932, which is an 84-year-old law as of this 
writing.519 The criminal offenses that are listed in this law are deemed punishable under 
the Revised Penal Code, in which there must be clear parameters in converting common 
crimes into terrorism.520 As discussed in Chapter I, anyone that commits a felony as 
enumerated by this anti-terrorism law shall be prosecuted as a terrorist. For instance, 
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anyone who commits murder can be prosecuted as a terrorist. This violates our universal 
definition of terrorism because it must be politically or religiously motivated.  
The HSA of 2007 has no exact definition of murder or how it is different from 
other acts of killing innocent people. This law defines terrorism vaguely or not at all. The 
law does not even provide an exact or accurate categorization of the terms terrorism, 
mass murder, or hate crime. This law has failed to provide a clear distinction between 
terrorist and criminal acts; thus, any violation of felonies as enumerated in this anti-
terrorism law shall be categorized as terrorist acts.  
4. The support of some local politicians and the populace within its area of 
operations has made the ASG more resilient and effective against the 
intensive counterterrorism efforts of the government.  
As long as some local communities in Mindanao remain sympathetic to the ASG, 
even the best CT strategy and approach will appear ineffective. Undeniably, popular 
support is critically important in any war or conflict and winning the hearts and minds of 
the people serves as a potent weapon of the ASG. Sympathetic communities in far-flung 
areas of Basilan and Sulu provide crucial support that renders intensive military and law 
enforcement operations futile. The support coming from corrupt local politicians down to 
the community level to the ASG has been also one of the concerns in those areas. This is 
one of the reasons why the ASG can evade strategically emplaced military and police 
checkpoints and even naval blockades off the waters of Zamboanga, Basilan, and Sulu. In 
addition, it can continuously conduct successful domestic and cross-border kidnapping 
operations.  
5. The cross-border operations will persist because they are strategically and 
tactically important for the ASG.  
At the tactical level, trans-border kidnapping operations undeniably improved the 
group’s capabilities and reinforced their resolve to conduct more high-impact kidnapping 
cases due to their tested schemes and perceived high returns in terms of monetary 
rewards. Strategically, successful kidnapping operations within the territorial waters of 
Indonesia and Malaysia have made the current CT countermeasures and efforts of the 
Philippine government ineffective or inappropriate to stop this menace.  
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These kinds of violent activities have put the Philippines in a bad situation and 
marred the country’s reputation among its neighboring countries and regional partners. 
From a bigger perspective, shifting of the ASG’s activities from terrorism to crime is just 
an offshoot of its drive for money and power. But it could be possible that kidnappings—
as a criminal tactic—have been employed as a tool to generate funds in the absence of 
foreign support and strict implementation of laws against terrorist financing. 
6. The lack of good governance, law enforcement, and sense of security also 
prevent the people from resisting ASG’s criminal acts.  
Although some local communities or tribes in Zamboanga Peninsula, Basilan, and 
Sulu Archipelago have been against ASG’s violent and criminal activities, they opt to 
neither take any appropriate action nor cooperate with the military and police because of 
possible repercussions if they do so. In some cases, there is no government presence or 
semblance of control and governance in those far-flung areas, which makes it favorable 
and advantageous for terrorist or criminal organizations. For these communities, 
supporting or helping the ASG has been more beneficial than cooperating with 
government authorities because in some cases, the ASG has been providing financial 
support to poor and unfortunate villages. These areas are tactically important for the ASG 
in that they must be controlled and influenced for safe haven, logistical support, and 
recruitment bases. This is one of the compelling reasons why this group has been  
supported and protected by some Muslim communities, particularly in Basilan and Sulu 
Provinces.  
A. RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS FOR COUNTERTERRORISM 
STRATEGIES 
Despite the complex identity of the ASG as both a terrorist and a criminal 
organization, the response of the Philippine government has not changed. As a result, the 
government’s efforts have been less than successful. Although intense military operations 
are crucial in any counterterrorism strategy, the military approach alone has proved 
inadequate to defeat the ASG. Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte has ordered the 
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Armed Forces of the Philippines to intensify operations against the ASG.521 In response 
to this, the Philippine military deployed more combat troops in Basilan and Sulu 
provinces. The success of military operations in addressing the ASG, particularly its 
criminal activities, cannot be measured by the traditional military parameters alone. In 
fact, when the AFP takes the lead role to eliminate the ASG, the probability of success is 
considerably low.522 The presence of several military forces in Basilan and Sulu 
supported by some units from the PNP Special Action Force has failed to stop the ASG 
from conducting kidnapping activities. Recently, a South Korean cargo ship captain and 
one Filipino crewmember were abducted in the southern Philippines.523 The ASG 
cleverly executed this KFR operation and successfully evaded naval blockades off the 
waters of Basilan and Sulu. 
Much has been written on how to defeat terrorism in the Philippines, but which 
method is the most effective approach to eliminate the ASG can be a subject for debate 
and depends on existing variables. Therefore, this thesis offers significant 
recommendations to effectively combat the nexus of terrorism and crime, particularly in 
the case of the ASG, as enumerated below: 
1. Address the Socio-Economic and Ideological Aspects of Terrorism 
The Philippine government must undertake an in-depth study of the root causes of 
terrorism and determine appropriate responses to resolve, eliminate, or prevent the same 
causes from coming back. The Philippine government should address the 
marginalization, injustices, political oppression, and other grievances of Filipino Muslims 
because these issues provide inspiration for others to commit violence.524 The strength 
and resilience of the ASG lies in the weakness of the government to adequately address 
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these socio-economic and political issues. Thus, it is important that the Philippine 
government take the issues into consideration and act accordingly to address the 
“fundamental political, economic, and social grievances” of Muslim Mindanao.525 To 
address the socio-economic and political roots of terrorism is crucial for an effective 
counterterrorism strategy because terrorism proves to be politically and ideologically 
motivated.  
The AFP Internal Peace and Security Plan “Bayanihan” focuses on winning the 
peace and not just defeating the enemy. As such, its main objective is supporting 
community-based peace and development efforts, especially in conflict-affected areas. 
This campaign plan aims to promote the culture of peace. Thus, the AFP supports 
counter-radicalization and peace building initiatives, especially in Mindanao. For 
instance, the AFP facilitates the conduct of the Bishops-Ulama Forum. This forum is one 
way of engaging religious leaders from the Muslim and Christian faiths to enter into a 
dialogue in promoting the culture of peace and non-violence. It also serves as a platform 
to know the issues and other concerns to enhance further the implementation of peace 
education in the madrasah educational system. 
2. Engage and Empower Local Government Units 
The role of Local Government Units (LGUs) has proven to be crucial in counter-
insurgency, particularly in the case of the Philippines where internal conflict has been one 
of the perennial concerns. The prevalence of extreme poverty, social and cultural 
marginalization, ethnic discrimination, lack of efficient politics and the increasing 
economic difficulties in the Southern Philippines are some of the factors that drive 
Filipino Muslims to engage in violent extremism or crimes.526 This kind of political and 
socio-economic situation tends to be a good opportunity for the ASG to entice Muslim 
youths to join its organization. Empowering the LGUs can be instrumental in averting 
these outcomes, particularly at the local level. Empowering the LGUs pertains not only to 
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more financial support from the central government, but also encompasses effective 
mechanisms on how they can participate in a forum that will help other government 
agencies and institutions eliminate various threat groups. 
One of the measures initiated by the Philippine government is the creation of the 
Peace and Order Council (POC) at the regional and municipal level. The POC is a 
convergence mechanism wherein LGUs are encouraged and influenced to take the lead in 
addressing the underlying causes of insurgency and terrorism. The AFP conducts regular 
consultations and meetings with leaders of local government units. Since some of the 
POC members are political leaders elected by the people, they can influence or task 
community leaders to support the fight against terrorism and crime. The military and 
police can coordinate with LGUs on how to enhance intelligence networks, particularly 
in some far-flung areas that are frequently visited or under the influence of the enemy. 
3. Pursue an Intelligence-Driven Counterterrorism Operation 
Recognizing that intelligence is one important weapon in combating terrorism, 
AFP intelligence operations are geared towards identifying, monitoring and locating 
terrorists and other High-Value Individuals (HVIs). As William Fox Jr. argues, there is a 
“blurred line” between intelligence and combat operations, but in any type of 
counterterrorism operations, the intelligence organization has always been at the 
forefront.527 Both timely intelligence and accurate analysis are important, whether the 
Philippine government understands counterterrorism as a military or a criminal approach. 
Accurate and sound information is crucial in uncovering and subsequently preempting 
terrorists’ plans and intentions. Appropriate intelligence support is extended to the 
various Task Forces and Joint Task Forces that were created to address terrorism, 
kidnapping, and other forms of organized crime, particularly in Mindanao. Accurate and 
timely intelligence is not enough, however, without a proper mechanism for sharing and 
collaboration of efforts of various intelligence agencies. Intelligence fusion centers must 
be effective in consolidating and integrating all information necessary for analysis.  
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The military and police should employ all-source intelligence, which means 
fusing multi-source intelligence data into a single correlated picture. To promote 
intelligence fusion, the Joint AFP-PNP Intelligence Committee (JAPIC) was created at 
the national level and simulated down to the provincial level. Intelligence efforts are 
coordinated and controlled through the different Joint Intelligence Committees at all 
levels of the AFP hierarchy. Operations and intelligence fusion centers were also 
established in the military area commands. Moreover, the AFP coordinates with other 
government agencies and departments that are involved in combating terrorism.  
To augment the collection of intelligence on HVIs, the rewards system was 
instituted to provide informants the incentive to report the presence of these persons in 
their localities. The implementation of the rewards system has been effective in 
neutralizing terrorists. Since 2001, governments of the Philippines and the United States 
have paid informants a total of US$14M for providing vital information that led to the 
neutralization of ASG personalities and their cohorts.528 Thus, this paper highly 
recommends enhancing and continuing the rewards for justice program to entice quality 
informants who are crucial in intelligence operations. 
4. Enhance and Upgrade the Capabilities of the Military and Police 
Enhance and upgrade the current capabilities of the military and police to meet 
the current demand and challenges of the overall anti-terrorism effort of the government. 
Technological advances could help a lot in this effort. The Philippine government must 
pursue and continue the AFP Modernization Program. Although these upgrades are 
primarily intended for territorial defense, the acquisition of the latest military hardware 
and equipment can also be crucial in counterterrorism operations. Delfin Lorenzana, the 
secretary of the Department of National Defense, points out that he will continue 
modernizing the AFP through acquisition of aircraft, sea craft, and other essential 
equipment to enhance the capabilities of the military.529 Additionally, the DND has been 
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expediting the procurement of mission-essential equipment primarily intended to enhance 
the internal security operational capabilities of the AFP.530 The 15-year modernization 
program includes the acquisition of the following: 
Hamilton-class cutters, multipurpose assault craft, Armored Personnel 
Carriers, brand-new C-295 medium lift aircraft, C-130 heavy transports, 
FA-50PH light-interim fighter aircraft, naval/attack versions of the Agusta 
Westland AW-109 helicopters, landing craft heavies, and two strategic 
sealift vessels, and some other essential hardware and equipment.531 
In terms of gathering information against the terrorists, Human Intelligence 
(HUMINT) should be complemented by other important intelligence disciplines—Signal 
Intelligence (SIGINT) and Imagery Intelligence (IMINT). Although the AFP has this 
kind of equipment, it needs to upgrade and to procure the latest equipment and 
technology in the market. On the other hand, the Philippine Navy and Maritime Unit of 
the PNP have been exerting efforts in securing the maritime borders of Sulu to prevent 
the ASG from bringing kidnap victims from other Zamboanga Peninsula. To successfully 
accomplish this mission; it needs the latest and appropriate watercraft to establish 
checkpoints around critical island provinces and to flag down suspicious high speed 
motorboats along these waters.  
5. Pursue Stronger Bilateral, Regional, and International Cooperation 
for Terrorism and Crime 
Cooperation with regional partners is crucial to a long-term solution to defeat the 
transnational nature of terrorism and organized crime. Thus, the Philippines must 
strengthen its collaboration with regional and international partners to combat terrorism 
and crime. The Philippines as an archipelagic country can benefit a lot from this regional 
bilateral and multilateral cooperation. Porous borders in the south between Malaysia and 
Indonesia serve as an ideal transit route for the terrorists and criminals.  
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These territorial borders proved to be a huge challenge to secure because the AFP 
and Philippine Coast Guard (PCG) lack adequate equipment and tools to continuously 
conduct security patrols and effectively secure the country’s territorial waters. In 
addition, these weaknesses can be offset through multilateral and bilateral cooperation 
and collaboration with other Asian neighbors. Abuza points out, “ASEAN is the 
appropriate organization to take the lead on counterterrorism, as the mechanisms and 
processes are already in place such as the annual meetings of heads of state, foreign 
ministers, military chiefs, intelligence chiefs, and police chiefs.”532 The AFP cooperates 
with neighboring countries like Indonesia and Malaysia, with whom the Philippines has 
existing border patrol and border crossing arrangements. These arrangements help in 
securing the tri-border area in the Sulu and Celebes seas and restricting the travel of ASG 
and other terrorists to and from these countries.  
B. RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS TO PREEMPT AND PREVENT 
KIDNAPPINGS 
A traditional military approach is only part of the solution against the kidnapping 
operations of the ASG. According to Alvarez, “ASG kidnap for ransom is a simple 
problem complicated by several intangible factors, which requires a complex solution. It 
necessitates the cooperation of all stakeholders and a sincere desire to end the 
problem.”533 The Philippine government should adopt a comprehensive strategy that 
integrates all concerned government agencies and institutions. Moreover, this paper 
provides policymakers a logical and ground-based understanding of the kidnapping 
operations of the ASG. The following recommendations are inter-dependent parts of the 
solution to reduce cases of kidnapping in the southern part of Mindanao: 
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1. Strict Implementation of the “No Negotiation and No Ransom” 
Policies 
A strong political will is necessary for the strict implementation of the no 
negotiations with the terrorists and no ransom policies of the government, and a strong 
hand needs to strictly implement these policies. Legislative measures to preempt 
kidnapping incidents include passing a law that would punish those who acted as 
negotiators during kidnapping incident, and those who would pay ransom. Doing this 
may discourage concerned individuals who have vested interests to act as negotiators. 
Without any ransom payment, the kidnappers may be discouraged from abducting 
someone because of the risk, effort, and financial considerations of such operations. 
Additionally, good governance must be initiated and taken seriously by the national 
government. If the national government will not address the problems of corruption and 
governance at the local level, kidnappings will remain a major concern. 
Corruption must be stopped at the level of the local government units, and those 
who are involved in the said malfeasance must be investigated and sanctioned if found 
guilty. To get rid of corruption and malfeasance within the ranks of local government 
executives, in the police, and in the military, strong political will is also a key factor. 
Although the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), a revenue share of the local government 
units from the Philippine national government, undoubtedly plays a major role in political 
activities, this is often not enough to finance political ambitions. As such, some 
politicians would resort to other sources of funds, such as kidnapping activities in 
collusion with the ASG. 
In this context, good governance depends on the sincerity of the national 
government down to the local government units, especially the local chief executives, in 
delivering and providing public services and creating infrastructure to gain the trust and 
support of the community. Moreover, equally important in this endeavor is the 
establishment of a local defense system that will protect significant infrastructure projects 
and other high impact government projects to alleviate poverty of concerned 
communities. Enhancement of community defense is also crucial in reinforcing security 
in the community against violence and coercion from different threat groups.  
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2. Formulation of a National Strategy against Kidnapping 
The formulation of a national strategy against kidnapping, which includes the 
creation of an agency or an inter-agency task force to coordinate efforts in countering 
kidnapping activities of the ASG and other lawless elements in Mindanao, should be 
initiated by a legislative body. This may include placing AFP and other law enforcement 
units under one command or agency. Although it is easy to say, this is very hard to 
realize and even harder to implement on the ground. Without the strong political will of 
those who would be heading this inter-agency task force, then this is just another viable 
solution in writing and a waste of efforts and resources. 
3. Enhancement of Border Cooperation 
The Philippines must strengthen its border crossing and border patrol 
arrangements with its neighboring countries in the south, particularly Indonesia and 
Malaysia. To control movement of terrorists and criminals along the borders in the south, 
it requires responsive and appropriate border procedures and countermeasures. Joint and 
coordinated border security patrols with regional partners along with sharing of 
information are crucial to prevent movement of both individuals and funds that have links 
with terrorist and criminal activities. There should be more responsive and regular 
exchanges at the operational level, and those more extensive linkages should be 
developed among multilateral agencies of each country operating in the border areas. 
Doing these measures would mitigate the lack of or inadequate operational data 
concerning terror organizations, plans, regional associates and sympathizers, and among 
others. 
4. Pursue an Effective Counter-Radicalization Program 
This can be done effectively through a multi-sectoral approach, primarily 
composed of the religious sectors, communities and LGUs supported by the military and 
the police. According to Hedieh Mirahmadi and Mehreen Farooq, while several ways 
lead to radicalization, “an undeniable driving force is the propagation of radical 
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ideologies.”534 They assert that the government needs “to look beyond the traditional law 
enforcement approaches in which authorities intervene just before or after an act of 
terrorism.”535 Counter radicalization programs and initiatives must be one of the key 
programs of the government “to deter individuals from radicalizing or becoming 
radicalized.”536 The Philippine government should appropriate funds in various 
community-led initiatives of moderate Muslims.  
In countering radicalization, the Philippine government must invest in social and 
community research to better understand the threat of radicalization. Funding for such a 
program may come from the government as well as from private corporations or from the 
international community. Additionally, law enforcement agencies must establish rapport 
and create good partnerships with moderate Muslims who will lead the struggle against 
radicalization in the communities. Filipino Muslims need to be empowered to counter 
radical ideology and discourage KFR activities. In addition, some activities inside the 
mosques must also be monitored to ensure that these religious institutions are not being 
used to propagate radical ideology. 
Moreover, Mirahmadi and Farooq argue, “Counter-radicalization efforts of local 
mosque communities should be publicly recognized by government officials in their 
speeches, dinner receptions and awards ceremonies.”537 Underlining the contribution of 
Muslim leaders who promote and work for peace will serve as a good example for 
Muslim youths to follow.538 Also important, the Philippine government, through the 
National Commission on Muslim Filipinos (NCMF) as well as other Muslim groups in 
the country, should intensify the information campaign against radicalization. Finally, 
radicalization and ASG propaganda online must be confronted. The Internet has 
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increasingly become a significant medium for radicalizing Muslims and for the ASG to 
recruit potential followers by posting radical statements and articles. Integrated and 
coordinated efforts should be undertaken to counter ASG propaganda and radicalization 
online.  
5. Promotion of Multi-Sectoral Information Advocacy  
The aim of this advocacy is to target religious schools, particularly Islamic 
schools or madrasas, focusing on the ills of KFR activities. Aside from this advocacy 
campaign, the government, particularly the Department of Education, with the support of 
the NCMF, must continuously monitor madrasa education in the country to ensure that 
these institutions do not become breeding grounds of terrorist activity and the spread of 
radical ideas. It is important to note that madrasas are scattered all over the Philippines, 
with the majority found in Central and Western Mindanao.539  
It is estimated that there are between 600 and 1,000 madrasas in Mindanao, with 
a total student population of between 60,000 and 100,000.540 This advocacy represents a 
major step in upgrading madrasah education in the country and in developing young 
Muslims to become progressive, peace-loving, and responsible members of the 
community, which in turn will help lure them away from joining the ASG and engaging 
in KFR activities. 
6. Empower the Communities and Encourage Citizen’s Active 
Participation 
The community must be engaged and encouraged to increase their commitment 
and vigilance to report suspicious activities leading to kidnapping. In addition, support 
the authorities with evidence to clarify and prosecute said crime, using community 
organizations, foundations, Non-Government Organizations, and private companies to 
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support this cause. It is crucial for the people to know their true strength, which comes 
from their unity to fight the threat and stop the relentless kidnapping in Mindanao. 
In one study conducted by Alvarez, he points out that one notable characteristic of 
the Tausug tribe is its deep sense of familial ties.541 The bond that unites these Tausug 
tribe members became their strongest weapon against the ASG. The elders of this tribe 
inculcate an old tradition and culture of closeness and alliances between family members 
and relatives by blood or intermarriages. Tausug know very well that strong alliances 
stem from the basic social formation—the family.542 These alliances are what make the 
entire Tausug tribe very strong. Alvarez cites the case of one place in Sulu—Barangay 
Bungkaung543—where a strong family bond evolved into “multi-family alliances.”544 
Residents of this barangay strongly opposed the influence of the ASG and its kidnapping 
business, which shows that power lies in the unity of the families in the said area.545 This 
kind of alliance among Tausug families can be a good model for other Muslim tribes to 
emulate in order to resist the threat and influence from the ASG.  
7. Effective Law Enforcement Operations 
These measures would work successfully if coupled with adequate police 
visibility in affected areas, as well as the establishment of a local defense system in the 
community, which will deny criminal elements the opportunity to execute planned 
atrocities. Likewise, strengthening the functions and mandate of the PNP-AKG in the 
region would preempt and prevent the prevalence of kidnapping. With regard to the 
experience of Britain against the IRA, Richardson argues that a weak and “highly 
fragmented” police organization, in which each police force in England and Wales has its 
own special branch, makes coordination difficult and results in a perennial problem of 
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rivalry among security forces.546 He also points out that lack of enough police personnel 
is one of the factors why the police in England and Wales failed to preempt or prevent 
terrorism in its area of responsibilities. 
Traditionally, counterterrorism in the Philippines has been the responsibility of 
the military; without the support of the local government units coupled with weak 
governance, however, the military forces cannot effectively defeat the terrorists and 
totally dismantle their organization and support system. Scott N. McKay and David A. 
Webb claim that “since 2010, the Philippine government has made an effort to pass the 
domestic counterterrorism mission from the military to the national police, but the 
transition has been slow and beleaguered by distrust and competition between the two 
organizations.”547 
8. Intensify Information Sharing 
According to Louise Richardson, “the most important weapon in any campaign 
against terrorism is intelligence.”548 He claims that even the British government 
encountered the perennial problem of intelligence coordination between the police and 
the military in terms of gathering and sharing of critical information. Intelligence 
cooperation and active collaboration between and among local intelligence agencies in 
the area are crucial to effectively monitor the plans and activities of the ASG, particularly 
its criminal activities. Information exchange, particularly with Malaysian counterparts on 
the issue of kidnapping, must likewise be pursued. Notably, Malaysia believes that some 
‘water villages’549 in Sabah, particularly in Semporna, serve as hideouts for Philippine 
kidnappers and also as a safe haven for kidnap victims prior to their transit to the 
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Philippines. Some residents of these water villages are also believed to act as spotters of 
potential kidnap victims in Sabah. 
The British intelligence approach in Northern Ireland is one good example of how 
effective collaboration among intelligence units of the military and police could be 
crucial in any counterterrorism operations. Despite several sub-units that are operating 
against one specific terrorist organization in Northern Ireland, a clear guideline outlines 
how intelligence collection and operations will be conducted. Thus, serious lapses and 
problems have been avoided with regard to coordination between the military and the 
police.550 
C. FINAL THOUGHTS 
As terrorism has been evolving and becoming a global concern, various nations 
have tried different strategies and approaches to combat terrorism. Although the current 
Philippine CT strategy and approach have been successful in decimating the ASG, it 
needs further restudy to be more responsive and proactive. Terrorism and crime remain 
one of the security concerns in Mindanao, particularly the relentless kidnappings of the 
ASG. A strategy and approach must be perfected that is appropriate against hybrid 
organizations such as the ASG. Moreover, this perpetual concern of terrorism requires an 
in-depth assessment and analysis to come up with a rational and comprehensive set of 
countermeasures and responses.  
The current deployment of more troops in Basilan and Sulu provinces clearly 
suggests that the Philippines heavily relies on fighting terrorism with a military model 
approach, and massive deployment of troops and intense military operations do not really 
deter or prevent terrorism and crime in Mindanao. Although this approach—as stated in 
IPSP “Bayanihan”—intends to involve and encourage the active participation of various 
stakeholders, still it seems inadequate and weak in terms of getting the complete support 
and cooperation of various concerned government and private agencies and institutions. 
                                                 
550 Richardson, “Britain and the IRA,” 82. 
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The Philippine government remains reactive to the terroristic and criminal 
activities emanating from the ASG; the countermeasures and approaches that have been 
developed and employed do not really deter or prevent terrorism and crime in Mindanao. 
Due to the multifarious socio-economic, political and cultural factors that contribute to 
the prevalence of kidnapping in Mindanao, the solution to the problem would necessitate 
a whole-nation and integrated approach. Various terrorist groups, particularly the ASG, 
will continue to pose huge challenges to the Philippine government in the next few years. 
The ASG will still see kidnapping as a lucrative undertaking as this has largely sustained 
the group and part of the communities where it operates. It is expected that the ASG will 
continue with abductions, both within and outside its traditional bases. IED attacks and 
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